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General Assembly
Fifty-seventh session

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Agenda items 36, 37, 44, 56, 101 and 160

The situation in the Middle East

The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security

Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit

Peace, security and reunification on the Korean peninsula

International drug control

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Letter dated 4 December 2002 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the joint communiqué on the outcome of the meeting of the Council of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, adopted in Moscow on 23 November 2002 (see annex).

On behalf of the Permanent Missions to the United Nations of the member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and as the representative of the country in which the meeting was held, I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 36, 37, 44, 56, 101 and 160, and also of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Sergey **Lavrov**

02-72668 (E) 121202 121202

Annex to the letter dated 4 December 2002 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]

Joint communiqué on the outcome of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

On 23 November 2002, a meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was held in Moscow. The participants were: Tang Jiaxuan, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China; Kasymzhomart Tokayev, Secretary of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan; Askar Aitmatov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic; Igor Ivanov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; Talbak Nazarov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan; and Abdulaziz Kamilov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

A constructive and intense debate was held on two sets of issues: SCO activities and urgent international problems.

It was noted with satisfaction that cooperation within the framework of SCO in various fields, as provided for in the organization's Charter, signed at the highest level on 7 June 2002 in St. Petersburg, has been developing steadily and becoming ever more diverse. The sides agreed to prepare concrete proposals for further structuring and deepening multilateral cooperation in the framework of the organization in advance of the next meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the six countries.

The ministers noted that, in accordance with the agreements reached at the St. Petersburg meeting of the heads of the member States SCO, intensive work was under way to put into operation speedily SCO mechanisms. Thus far, key questions had been decided concerning the establishment of the SCO secretariat in Beijing, and common approaches to resolving issues relating to the SCO budget and the establishment of the headquarters of the SCO Regional Antiterrorist Structure in Bishkek had been worked out. The National Coordinators Council and relevant expert working groups were in the process of preparing the draft international legal instruments necessary to ensure the functioning of SCO and its agencies, with a view to their submission for signature at the next meeting of heads of State in 2003.

It was deemed advisable that the foreign-policy departments of the six countries, guided by the St. Petersburg Declaration, signed at the highest level, should agree specific proposals, in advance of the next meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council, for promoting multilateral cooperation in the framework of SCO to counter the growing threat of illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and precursors.

On the basis of the fundamental principle of the openness of SCO and the fact that its activities are not directed against any States or international associations, and striving to ensure that SCO, an organization already in the process of being established, can actively participate in international relations and make a genuine contribution to strengthening stability, security and peace at the regional and global levels, the Ministers have signed an Interim Framework governing SCO relations

with other international organizations and States, to apply until the entry into force of the corresponding permanent SCO normative instruments.

Having exchanged views on the world situation, the Ministers noted the urgent need to strengthen the efforts of all countries in combating international terrorism, separatism and extremism, organized crime, illicit trafficking in drugs and arms, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, environmental degradation, the depletion of natural resources, mass illegal migration, persistent poverty and backwardness, HIV/AIDS and other new challenges. The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of the speedy establishment of a global system for counteracting contemporary threats and challenges, to include appropriate multilateral cooperation mechanisms, inter alia, for early warning and the prevention of emerging threats, as well as a resolute and commensurate response, to them.

At the meeting, it was pointed out that, although the fight against terrorism was assuming global proportions, terrorist acts had not ceased and continued to pose a very grave threat to international peace and security. In that connection, the Ministers expressed firm support for the resolute actions taken by the leaders of the Russian Federation to free hostages during the terrorist act that took place in October 2002 in Moscow, causing the death of a large number of innocent people.

The Ministers consider it an urgent task for the international community to strengthen the international legal basis for counter-terrorism, including through the earliest adoption of a comprehensive convention on international terrorism and an international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism, with a simultaneous strengthening of the leadership role of the United Nations in combating terrorism. SCO member States support the international community's efforts to block the channels for financing terrorist activities, and also fully support the provisions of the Declaration on Measures to Counter the Financing of Terrorism approved by the Regional Forum (AFR) of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in July 2002.

The Ministers noted a common understanding that the strengthening of stability in the Central Asian region continued to constitute a top priority for the SCO member States in the field of security. In this context, they reaffirmed the intention of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to promote cooperation with international associations operating in the region.

The Ministers expressed concern at the upsurge in separatist tendencies in various Asian countries and the growing links between terrorism and separatism. They declared their firm resolve to continue to support fully States' efforts to ensure their sovereignty and territorial integrity and stressed the inadmissibility of attempts to justify terrorism and separatism on religious, national or political grounds.

The Ministers reaffirmed the common interest of SCO member States in Afghanistan's peaceful development and expressed support for Afghanistan's Transitional Authority in its efforts to normalize and stabilize the situation in the country and to achieve economic reconstruction pursuant to the Bonn Agreement of 5 December 2001, the decisions of the Loya Jirga convened in June 2002 and United Nations Security Council resolutions.

International cooperation to eliminate terrorism in Afghanistan was given a positive assessment. At the same time, serious concern was expressed at the evident

growth in narcotic drugs production as the chief source of financing for internal armed conflict and international terrorism, and the drug danger threatening SCO member countries. Proposals to establish anti-drug "security zones" along Afghanistan's borders were deemed useful in that connection.

The Ministers agreed that the six SCO member States would intensify their exchange of views on Afghan issues, inter alia, through their Permanent Representatives to the United Nations, including the questions of providing assistance to Afghanistan in tackling social and economic problems and rendering humanitarian aid to the Afghan people.

The Ministers voiced their support for international efforts — collective or individual — promoting the search for ways to establish peace and stability in the Middle East, as well as for the unconditional implementation by both parties to the conflict of the well-known United Nations Security Council resolutions.

The Ministers expressed the hope that Security Council resolution 1441 (2002) on Iraq as well as the resumption of the activities of international inspectors in Iraq would make it possible to settle the Iraq problem by peaceful means and with observance of all international norms.

The Ministers endorsed the nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula, reaffirmed their support for the position in favour of settling relevant issues through peaceful dialogue, and emphasized that the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula was in the interests of all parties.

The Ministers considered that multilateral negotiation mechanisms for safeguarding security in Asia should complement each other rather than compete with one another.

The Ministers call for the promotion of a working relationship between SCO and ASEAN for the purpose of intensifying information exchange and cooperation.

The Ministers spoke in favour of the further dynamic development of the process pursued at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia in accordance with the principles adopted at the Conference's First Summit (Almaty on 4 June 2002).

Support for the establishment in Asia of nuclear-weapon-free zones was reaffirmed on the understanding that such zones must take full account of the interests and concerns of all States.

The SCO member countries stand ready to engage in substantive cooperation on a basis of equality with all interested States and international associations in promoting peace and development in the region and throughout the world in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

23 November 2002

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General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Fifty-seventh year

Identical letters dated 6 December 2002 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Israel, the occupying Power, continues to commit war crimes against the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. Even during the holiest days of the year, the Palestinian people have not been spared the wrath of the occupying Power, which seeks to ensure their constant suffering and loss. The latest crimes and atrocities by the occupying Power against the civilian population under its occupation have been committed during the Eid al-Fitr holiday, marking the end of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.

In the pre-dawn hours (Palestine time) of today, more than 40 Israeli tanks and armoured vehicles, backed by helicopter gunships, raided the Breij refugee camp in the Gaza Strip. Launching an assault with tank shelling, machine-gun fire and helicopter-fired missiles, the Israeli occupying forces killed 10 Palestinians, including a woman and several members of the same families, and wounded at least 20 other people. Among those killed by the occupying forces were two UNRWA workers, Ahlam Riziq Kandil, a 31-year-old school teacher, and Osama Hassan Tahrawi, a 31-year-old school attendant, who was killed in the raid along with his brother. In addition to the brutal killings committed, this Israeli attack in such a densely crowded refugee camp caused extensive damage and destruction to shelters and property throughout the camp. Moreover, at least one home in particular was targeted for demolition and was blown up by the occupying forces during their raid.

The military assault against the Breij refugee camp comes on the heels of a series of consecutive attacks carried out by the Israeli occupying forces in the Gaza Strip, including the extrajudicial execution of a Palestinian man two days ago. On Wednesday, 4 December, the occupying forces launched a helicopter missile strike against a Palestinian Authority facility, killing Mustafa Sabah, 35 years old. The occupying forces indeed declared that Mr. Sabah was targeted for assassination. The occupying Power must be held accountable for this war crime and for all other war crimes and atrocities committed against the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem.

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Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable for all of the cold-blooded killings of Palestinian men, women and children committed by the occupying forces. It must be held accountable for the countless extrajudicial executions perpetrated. It must be held accountable for the wanton destruction wrought by the occupying forces throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory. It must be held accountable for the thousands of Palestinians imprisoned, detained and tortured. Israel, the occupying Power, cannot continue to commit war crimes, State terrorism and systematic human rights violations against the Palestinian people with impunity. It cannot continue to carry out this bloody military campaign and continue to collectively punish an entire people with impunity. Israel must be held responsible for all of its illegal policies and practices and all serious violations and grave breaches of international law and international humanitarian law, and the perpetrators of these crimes must be brought to justice.

The international community must act urgently to address the crisis situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, after now more than 27 months of this brutal Israeli military campaign against the Palestinian people. The United Nations Security Council in particular, in upholding its duty for the maintenance of international peace and security, must take the necessary action to bring a halt to the ongoing Israeli crimes and violations being committed against the Palestinian people.

In follow-up to my previous 147 letters to you regarding the crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem dated from 29 September 2000 to 3 December 2002 (A/55/432-S/2000/921; A/55/437-S/2000/930; A/55/450-S/2000/957; A/55/466-S/2000/971; A/55/474-S/2000/984; A/55/490-S/2000/993; A/ES-10/39-S/2000/1015; A/ES-10/40-S/2000/1025; A/ES-10/42-S/2000/1068; A/ES-10/43-S/2000/1078; A/ES-10/44-S/2000/1093; A/ES-10/45-S/2000/1104; A/ES-10/46-S/2000/1107; A/ES-10/47-S/2000/1116; A/ES-10/48-S/2000/1129; A/ES-10/49-S/2000/1154; A/ES-10/50-S/2000/1173; A/ES-10/51-S/2000/1185; A/ES-10/52-S/2000/1206; A/ES-10/53-S/2000/1247; A/ES-10/54-S/2001/7; A/ES-10/55-S/2001/33; A/ES-10/56-S/2001/50; A/ES-10/57-S/2001/101; A/ES-10/58-S/2001/131; A/ES-10/59-S/2001/156; A/ES-10/60-S/2001/175; A/ES-10/61-S/2001/189; A/ES-10/64-S/2001/209; A/ES-10/65-S/2001/226; A/ES-10/66-S/2001/239; A/ES-10/67-S/2001/255; A/ES-10/68-S/2001/284; A/ES-10/69-S/2001/295; A/ES-10/70-S/2001/304; A/ES-10/71-S/2001/314; A/ES-10/72-S/2001/332; A/ES-10/75-S/2001/352; A/ES-10/76-S/2001/372; A/ES-10/79-S/2001/418; A/ES-10/80-S/2001/432; A/ES-10/81-S/2001/447; A/ES-10/82-S/2001/463; A/ES-10/83-S/2001/471; A/ES-10/84-S/2001/479; A/ES-10/85-S/2001/486; A/ES-10/86-S/2001/496; A/ES-10/87-S/2001/504; A/ES-10/88-S/2001/508; A/ES-10/89-S/2001/544; A/ES-10/90-S/2001/586; A/ES-10/91-S/2001/605; A/ES-10/92-S/2001/629; A/ES-10/93-S/2001/657; A/ES-10/94-S/2001/669; A/ES-10/95-S/2001/686; A/ES-10/96-S/2001/697; A/ES-10/97-S/2001/708; A/ES-10/98-S/2001/717; A/ES-10/99-S/2001/742; A/ES-10/100-S/2001/754; A/ES-10/101-S/2001/783; A/ES-10/102-S/2001/785; A/ES-10/103-S/2001/798; A/ES-10/104-S/2001/812; A/ES-10/105-S/2001/814; A/ES-10/107-S/2001/821; A/ES-10/108-S/2001/826; A/ES-10/111-S/2001/880; A/ES-10/112-S/2001/918; A/ES-10/114-S/2001/928; A/ES-10/115-S/2001/932; A/ES-10/116-S/2001/941; A/ES-10/117-S/2001/971; A/ES-10/118-S/2001/989; A/ES-10/119-S/2001/991; A/ES-10/121-S/2001/1007; A/ES-10/122-S/2001/1024; A/ES-10/123-S/2001/1036; A/ES-10/124-S/2001/1084; A/ES-10/125-S/2001/1092; A/ES-10/126-S/2001/1118; A/ES-10/128-

S/2001/1149; A/ES-10/129-S/2001/1166; A/ES-10/133-S/2001/1239; A/ES-10/134-S/2001/1261; A/ES-10/136-S/2002/18; A/ES-10/137-S/2002/39; A/ES-10/138-S/2002/48; A/ES-10/139-S/2002/58; A/ES-10/140-S/2002/89; A/ES-10/141-S/2002/95; A/ES-10/142-S/2002/102; A/ES-10/143-S/2002/121; A/ES-10/144-S/2002/142; A/ES-10/145-S/2002/146; A/ES-10/146-S/2002/165; A/ES-10/147-S/2002/175; A/ES-10/148-S/2002/182; A/ES-10/149-S/2002/186; A/ES-10/150-S/2002/214; A/ES-10/151-S/2002/223; A/ES-10/152-S/2002/232; A/ES-10/154-S/2002/242; A/ES-10/155-S/2002/248; A/ES-10/156-S/2002/245; A/ES-10/157-S/2002/253; A/ES-10/158-S/2002/258; A/ES-10/159-S/2002/281; A/ES-10/160-S/2002/307; A/ES-10/161-S/2002/319; A/ES-10/162-S/2002/330; A/ES-10/163-S/2002/340; A/ES-10/164-S/2002/353; A/ES-10/165-S/2002/361; A/ES-10/166-S/2002/370; A/ES-10/167-S/2002/433; A/ES-10/168-S/2002/474; A/ES-10/169-S/2002/495; A/ES-10/173-S/2002/536; A/ES-10/174-S/2002/555; A/ES-10/175-S/2002/610; A/ES-10/176-S/2002/617; A/ES-10/177-S/2002/641; A/ES-10/178-S/2002/650; A/ES-10/179-S/2002/654; A/ES-10/180-S/2002/686; A/ES-10/181-S/2002/697; A/ES-10/182-S/2002/699; A/ES-10/183-S/2002/717; A/ES-10/184-S/2002/738; A/ES-10/185-S/2002/827; A/ES-10/190-S/2002/891; A/ES-10/192-S/2002/976; A/ES-10/193-S/2002/983; A/ES-10/194-S/2002/1052; A/ES-10/195-S/2002/1066; A/ES-10/196-S/2002/1083; A/ES-10/197-S/2002/1094; A/ES-10/198-S/2002/1104; A/ES-10/199-S/2002/1114; A/ES-10/200-S/2002/1144; A/ES-10/201-S/2002/1166; A/ES-10/202-S/2002/1244; A/ES-10/203-S/2002/1270; A/ES-10/204-S/2002/1298 and A/ES-10/205-S/2002/1319), I regret to inform you that, since my last letter to you, at least 14 Palestinians, including children, have been killed by Israeli occupying forces. This raises the total number of Palestinian martyrs killed since 28 September 2000 to 1,979. (The names of the martyrs that have been identified thus far are contained in the annex to the present letter.)

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nasser **Al-Kidwa**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations

Annex to the identical letters dated 6 December 2002 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Names of martyrs killed by Israeli occupying forces in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem* (Tuesday, 3 December 2002, through Friday, 6 December 2002)

Tuesday, 3 December 2002

Fatma Mohamed Eissa Sarahneh (95 years old)

Wednesday, 4 December 2002

1. Samy Kazem Shawer
2. Ahmed Dawood Surour
3. Mustafa Ahmed Sabah

Friday, 5 December 2002

1. Abdel Munem Mohamed Al Bahr
2. Ahlam Rizq Kandil
3. Mohamed Abdel Hamid Al Owe'ni
4. Imad Abdel Hamid Al Owe'ni
5. Raed Yehia Ramadan
6. Tareq Yehia Ramadan
7. Marwan Hasan Al Tahrawy (16 years old)
8. Osama Hasan Al Tahrawy
9. Hazem Jameel Abu Abdou
10. Ramy Omar Al A'lem

* The total number of Palestinian martyrs killed by Israeli occupying forces since 28 September 2000 is 1,979.

United Nations S/2002/1337

Security Council

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6 December 2002

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Letter dated 6 December 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Angola to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the Declaration of the Government of Angola on the peace process dated 19 November 2002 (see annex).

I should be most grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ismael A. **Gaspar Martins**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

02-72634 (E) 061202

Annex to the letter dated 6 December 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Angola to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Declaration of the Government of Angola on the peace process

The forthcoming conclusion of the activities of the Joint Commission, created under the Lusaka Protocol, will take place at a crucial moment in the consolidation of peace and national reconciliation in the Republic of Angola. The extension of the administration of the State is starting to be normalized and people and goods can circulate freely throughout the national territory.

The principles and values embedded in the Constitution, especially those that relate to national unity, human dignity, pluralism of expression and political organization as well as the respect and guarantee of human rights and fundamental freedoms are the basic and essential premises for political life and national reconciliation.

In this sense the Government of Angola believes the conditions are set for all political parties to develop their political activities, in keeping with the legislation throughout the nation. In this context UNITA, now a political party, will naturally conduct its activities at a national level.

The Government is glad to perceive that the country is emerging as a stable and secure political environment. It therefore reiterates its optimism and underscores the generosity and dedication of all of those that suffered necessities and sacrifices as they struggled for peace. The Government is aware that there is still a lot to be done since national reconciliation will not be exhausted by the application of the final calendar of the Lusaka Protocol.

The Government recognizes the importance of continuing to work closely with UNITA, in a bilateral forum, for it is convinced that the dialogue will contribute to the consolidation of national reconciliation and to the stability of the country. It also recognizes the usefulness for the above process of the contribution of the rest of the political forces as well as that of civil and professional associations.

The Government reaffirms its intention to implement a social reinsertion programme for those that were demobilized and the resettlement of the displaced, as well as to fight against poverty and strive for its eradication; a struggle for which it hopes to continue to receive the support of the international community.

The Government reiterates its conviction that the democratic institutions in Angola are the effective instruments for channelling protests and expressing disagreements and desires for reform and change, within the framework of the law.

The Angolan Government considers that the forthcoming conclusion of the activities of the Joint Commission for the Peace Process is a turning point in our history, the beginning of a new era, when all Angolans from Cabinda to Cunene should, united, transform the Republic of Angola into a peaceful, prosperous and modern nation, capable of ensuring the physical, material and spiritual well-being of all its citizens.

On this occasion, the Government of the Republic of Angola would like to convey to UNITA its appreciation for its efforts in the observance of the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding and the Act of Commitment for the final conclusion of the Lusaka Protocol. On the other hand, it would like to express its gratitude to the United Nations and the country members of the Troika for their important role in the peace process, and to the international community for the support extended to the Angolan people.

19 November 2002

Government of National Unity and Reconciliation

United Nations S/2002/1338

Security Council

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17 December 2002

Original: English

Letter dated 16 December 2002 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) addressed to the President of the Security Council

In accordance with paragraph 10 of Security Council resolution 1390 (2002), I have the honour to transmit herewith the third report of the Monitoring Group established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1363 (2001) (see annex). I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be brought to the attention of the Council members and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Alfonso **Valdivieso**
Chairman
Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1267 (1999)

02-72572 (E) 181202

Annex

Letter dated 4 December 2002 from the Chairman of the Monitoring Group established pursuant to resolution 1363 (2001) and extended by resolution 1390 (2002) addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999)

On behalf of the members of the Monitoring Group established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1363 (2001) and assigned, pursuant to resolution 1390 (2002), to monitor for a period of 12 months the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 2 of the latter resolution, I have the honour to attach the third report in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 1390 (2002) (see enclosure).

I remain,
Dear Mr. Chairman,

Yours sincerely,
(*Signed*) Michael **Chandler**
Chairman
Monitoring Group established pursuant to resolution 1363 (2001)
and extended by resolution 1390 (2002)

(*Signed*) Hasan **Abaza**
Expert member

(*Signed*) Victor **Comras**
Expert member

(*Signed*) Philippe **Graver**
Expert member

(*Signed*) Surendra **Shah**
Expert member

Enclosure

Third report of the Monitoring Group established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1363 (2001) and extended by resolution 1390 (2002)

Summary

The Monitoring Group established by Security Council resolution 1363 (2001) and extended by resolution 1390 (2002) is mandated with monitoring, reporting on and making recommendations concerning the measures that the Security Council decided States shall take against Osama bin Laden, al-Qa'idah, the Taliban, and associated individuals and entities. These measures consist of an assets freeze, a travel ban and an arms embargo. This is the third report prepared by the Group under this mandate.

Important progress has been made in identifying and breaking up al-Qa'idah cells and/or arresting al-Qa'idah associates by a number of countries during the period covered by this report. However, a large number of al-Qa'idah operatives, and others trained by al-Qa'idah, remain at large and should be designated by States as terrorists. Several Governments have issued and/or reaffirmed warnings concerning possible further al-Qa'idah attacks.

The bombing of a discotheque in Bali, Indonesia, by Jemaah Islamiyah — a group directly linked with al-Qa'idah — and the more recent attacks in Mombasa underscore the wide reach of al-Qa'idah and the existence of a dangerous coalition of extremist groups in South-East Asia and others of like mind in East Africa. Additional information concerning al-Qa'idah is coming to light on a daily basis from many parts of the world, and this is assisting in the break-up of cells and helping to thwart al-Qa'idah plans. The growing cooperation between Governments represents a significant step forward in the fight against al-Qa'idah.

Al-Qa'idah is an insidious mass movement, and no country or group of countries can handle the problem alone. Without broad information-sharing, police investigative cooperation and the application of international system-wide financial controls, al-Qa'idah will continue to be able to resist, recruit and rearm. International cooperation needs further improvement.

Many countries remain reluctant to submit names to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) for designation, or to give the United Nations consolidated list sufficient attention in their domestic measures to counter al-Qa'idah and its associates. This approach has degraded the value of the list, which the group considers to be one of the key instruments supporting international cooperation in the implementation of resolution 1390 (2002).

The global effort to combat the financing of terrorism continues to face many challenges, stemming from the complexities of international financial transactions and the uneven application of regulatory and control measures. Many countries are imposing strict new anti-terrorism financing regulations on their domestic banking, as well as on correspondent banking and "offshore financial centres". But serious problems remain, and al-Qa'idah is still able to receive money. Occasionally transactions may still be routed through the international banking system. Efforts are

under way to identify countries and institutions that need resources in order to impose measures, as well as to identify those that continue to lack the will to do so. Al-Qa'idah has also adjusted its tactics to rely more heavily on local sources of funding.

The funding of al-Qa'idah and associated terrorist groups through charitable and other non-governmental organizations continues to be a major problem. Charities go unregulated in many countries. Several charities are now under investigation, and some have had their assets frozen. Financial regulatory authorities have also focused greater attention on informal transfer mechanisms, such as *hawala*. Such remittance systems have proved particularly useful to al-Qa'idah.

Al-Qa'idah also continues to be able to move about in its various areas of operation, e.g., Europe and South-East Asia, or between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is because a great many al-Qa'idah operatives remain unidentified or, if identified, information on them has not been communicated sufficiently to other jurisdictions or provided to the Committee for inclusion on the list. The borders in some of these areas are porous and/or difficult to monitor. In some cases, inadequate measures are in place to restrict such travel.

The application of the arms embargo continues to present a major challenge. Recent events have demonstrated that al-Qa'idah continues to have access to substantial quantities of arms and explosives. While a number of seizures have been recorded, the weapons confiscated represent only the tip of the iceberg. The Monitoring Group remains highly preoccupied by the risk of al-Qa'idah acquiring weapons of mass destruction or a "dirty" bomb.

Despite significant successes to date in the efforts to counter al-Qa'idah and its associates, the fight is far from over. Much work still needs to be done and can be achieved only through enhanced international cooperation. Security Council resolution 1390 (2002) has proved to be one of the key tools in realizing the level of cooperation required, but more could be achieved by strengthening the resolution and by requesting States to be more proactive in the fight against al-Qa'idah and its associates.

I. Introduction

1. The Security Council, on 16 January 2002, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, adopted resolution 1390 (2002), imposing financial and economic sanctions, a travel ban and an arms embargo on Osama bin Laden, members of al-Qa'idah, the Taliban and their associates and associated entities as referred to in the list established and maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999).

2. By paragraph 9 of resolution 1390 (2002), the Security Council requested that the Secretary-General assign the Monitoring Group established pursuant to resolution 1363 (2001) to monitor the implementation by Member States of the measures that it decided they should take, set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1390 (2002). The Group, as requested by the Council, has already submitted two reports to the Committee, on 29 April (S/2002/541) and on 22 August (S/2002/1050) 2002.

3. The Group, in continuing its practice of visiting States and learning first-hand the measures that they have taken to implement the resolution, has met with government officials in Austria, France, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy, Jordan, Luxembourg, Nepal, Pakistan, Singapore, Switzerland and the United States of America. The Group also met with officials of the Schengen Information System command centre in Strasbourg. In addition, the Group visited a number of international border entry points and talked with border control officials. This included an especially useful tour of the Iran/Afghanistan border. The Group also had an observer at the Kimberley Process meeting at Interlaken, on 4 and 5 November 2002. The Group continues also to draw on public data and information and the expertise of the private sector. The Group would like to place on record its appreciation to all concerned for their frank, open and comprehensive briefings.

4. The period covered by the present report, the third one to be presented by the Group, has seen a considerable degree of success in the fight against al-Qa'idah, with a number of arrests of al-Qa'idah operatives and the break-up or disruption of cells in a number of countries. However, al-Qa'idah and groups closely associated with it remain active (see annex I) and continue to pose a significant threat, globally, to peace and security.

5. The bombing of a holiday resort discotheque on the island of Bali, in Indonesia (12 October 2002), leaving more than 190 dead and hundreds wounded, has been attributed to Jemaah Islamiyah, which is linked to al-Qa'idah. In addition al-Qa'idah has been implicated in the attack on the French registered supertanker *Limburg*, off the coast of Yemen, an attack similar to that executed against the *USS Cole* (October 2000), and in shooting incidents against United States service personnel training in Kuwait. The Moscow theatre hostage-taking (24 October 2002), while not established as a direct effort of al-Qa'idah, was lauded on a recently released audio tape, which has been identified as most probably coming from Osama bin Laden. Also, initial indications concerning responsibility for the car bombing of a hotel and the attempt to shoot down a commercial airliner at Mombasa, Kenya, bear the hallmark of al-Qa'idah.

6. A number of Governments have also renewed or issued new warnings concerning the threats posed by al-Qa'idah and associated entities. This includes, but is not limited to, several references to possible attacks against shipping, civil and commercial infrastructure, diplomatic missions and centres of tourism.

II. The al-Qa'idah network

7. The Bali bombing has confirmed the extent of the relationship between al-Qa'idah and the loose coalition of extremist groups in South-East Asia. A concerted effort by the Governments of Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore, dating back to the autumn of 2001, led to the identification of a number of cells in the area linked to Jemaah Islamiyah, which had been planning terrorist attacks. More and more information is coming to light. Much of this information was obtained as a result of the successful break-up by the Singaporean authorities of a major operational cell. In addition, the recent arrests in Indonesia, arising from the investigation by the authorities there into the Bali incident, have provided further evidence of the dangers posed by al-Qa'idah and Jemaah Islamiyah in the region. The cooperation between these Governments represents a major step forward in the fight against al-Qa'idah. There are signs that law enforcement authorities around the world are increasingly successful in identifying and detaining members of al-Qa'idah and their associates. Some of the key suspects recently arrested are Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri and Imam Samudra.

8. The Mombasa attacks have been attributed by many States to al-Qa'idah. However, even if some may not perceive the individuals responsible to be a component part of al-Qa'idah, those involved have clearly drawn on the pronouncements of Osama bin Laden for their inspiration. Thus, by default, those responsible for these latest outrages in Kenya fall into the category of associates and associated entities as defined in resolution 1390 (2002), as do those connected with the Bali bombings. Together these incidents appear to indicate a shift in tactics by the al-Qa'idah network. Soft targets, preferably with maximum casualties, would now appear to be the order of the day. The success of the al-Qa'idah network's loosely affiliated cell system has again been demonstrated; a reminder, if one should be needed, of how this global scourge is manifesting itself. But the most important point that arises from these horrendous events is the need for even greater and more determined action, collectively, by all States of the United Nations to eradicate al-Qa'idah and all its manifestations.

9. One aspect of the al-Qa'idah phenomenon that is a major area of concern is the number of operatives that were trained in Afghanistan during the years that the training camps existed. These operatives have returned to their countries of origin or gone to others. They have been likened to time bombs — when the time comes they will "explode". By this the Group means that, following extensive planning and preparation of identified targets, they then act on receipt of the appropriate signal or the presentation of the appropriate opportunity. Most of these operatives remain at large. The authorities in the States where they are in waiting possibly know some of them. Many others are "dormant", and their identities and whereabouts are unknown.

10. One of the most recent developments to come to light is the apparent activation of new, albeit simple, training camps in eastern Afghanistan. Particularly disturbing about this trend is the fact that new volunteers are making their way to these camps, swelling the numbers of would-be al-Qa'idah activists and the longer-term capabilities of the network.

III. General observations

11. The representatives of all of the Governments with whom the Group met reiterated their Governments' commitment to discharging their responsibilities as Members of the United Nations in the fight against terrorism, and in particular in complying with resolution 1390 (2002). At the time of writing, only 79 States have submitted their 90-day reports, as requested in paragraph 6 of the resolution. The Group has not been able to assess the level of compliance of the States that have not responded. The Committee may wish to address this matter, as it is a fundamental aspect of compliance.

12. The fight against the al-Qa'idah network is proving to be a difficult and drawn-out undertaking. Al-Qa'idah is more than a terrorist organization that can be identified and eliminated. It is an insidious mass movement that must be dealt with using a broad range of tactics. This includes intelligence and information-gathering, military action, financial countermeasures, police investigation, travel restrictions and an arms embargo. It requires constant security consciousness and vigilance. Perhaps most importantly, it requires concrete international cooperation. No country or group of countries can handle the problem alone. Without broad information-sharing, police investigative cooperation and the application of international system-wide financial controls, al-Qa'idah will continue to be able to resist, recruit and rearm, and will continue to pose a danger to international peace and security in every region of the world. It is up to each country to take the measures necessary within its borders to deal with al-Qa'idah and its support mechanisms. Countries that fail in this endeavour undermine the efforts made elsewhere.

13. One of the most significant failings observed by the Group to date is the apparent reluctance of many countries, for various reasons, to submit the names of persons or entities they have identified as al-Qa'idah members, associates or associated entities. This includes all those individuals who, over time, have returned from training camps in Afghanistan and are known to the authorities. These individuals should be regarded as terrorists and treated accordingly. This failing has seriously degraded the value of the United Nations consolidated list, one of the key instruments supporting international cooperation. The list, in conjunction with resolution 1390 (2002), provides the only internationally recognized mechanism that assures that common steps are taken to deal with those designated.

IV. The United Nations consolidated list

14. The Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) has made progress in updating and reformulating the list of individuals and entities associated with Osama bin Laden, al-Qa'idah and the Taliban. The list is critical to the implementation of the measures set forth in paragraph 2 of resolution 1390 (2002). During the reporting period the Committee has added 16 individuals and 22 entities to the list. It has also de-listed three individuals and three entities. Progress has also been made in conforming the names to actual cultural usage.

15. Early in the period, the Committee requested States to provide additional identifying information with regard to the names already on the list. To date 11 States have responded with some useful information. The Group notes that this is a continuing process and that additional information is still needed concerning many

of the names on the list. States should be encouraged to provide this additional information as soon as possible. Nevertheless, the Group recommends that the Committee now begin to include and publish in the list the reformulated names and the information it has so far received. Additional information should be added as soon as possible after it has been received.

16. While additional names have recently been added to the list, it remains incomplete. In the last report the Group highlighted five key individuals who were not included on the list; Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Suleiman Abu Gaith and Said Bahaji. Since then only two, Said Bahaji and Ramzi bin al-Shibh have been designated. During the same period the number of persons alleged to be linked to al-Qa'idah who have been publicly identified but whose names have not been presented to the Committee is now in the order of 100 (see annex II). In addition, four of the "most wanted terrorists" — Imad Fayez Mugniyah, Ahmad Ibrahim al-Mughassil, Ali Saed bin al-Hoorie and Ibrahim Salih Mohammed al-Yacoub — appearing on the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation web page have also not been included on the list.

17. Only a few countries have provided the names of the persons or entities they have identified as associated with Osama bin Laden and al-Qa'idah. Many countries have refrained completely from providing names of such persons or entities. Several reasons have been cited for this lacuna. Several Governments questioned the validity of placing persons or entities on the list without judicial findings of culpability. Several indicated that they lack established procedures for determining which names of individuals or entities should be communicated to the Committee. Some countries were barred by rules of confidentiality covering ongoing criminal proceedings or investigations. Some indicated a reticence to provide the names of their own nationals. Some States were concerned that such actions would require them to freeze the assets of the persons named, with dire consequences for their families.

18. In sharp contrast to the foregoing observations was the massive support, from no less than 50 States, for the listing of Jemaah Islamiyah. It can be hoped that this concerted action is a turning point leading to the more active involvement of States with regard to future listings regarding al-Qa'idah and its associates.

19. The Group has sought, through discussions with the Committee and with States, to clarify the role and the status of the list. Several government officials with whom the Group met indicated differing views about the nature and effectiveness of the list. As indicated previously, a number of countries view the list as the document defining specific persons and entities that are subject to the measures imposed by resolution 1390 (2002). Some have questioned the way in which the list is composed and what it represents. It is unclear whether inclusion in the list indicates ipso facto that the persons named should be considered terrorists, or whether the list should be viewed as a preventive measure concerning persons who might be terrorists. Several countries have also questioned the methodology used to determine who should appear on the list. These questions carry with them important implications concerning the manner in which States fulfil their responsibilities to freeze assets or restrict the movement of persons pursuant to resolution 1390 (2002).

20. The Committee, on 7 November 2002, adopted new guidelines regarding the conduct of its work (see annex III). These guidelines provide a clearer indication of the procedures for the listing and de-listing of individuals and entities on the list. It is also considering guidelines to handle requests for exemptions, on humanitarian

grounds, from the measures imposed under paragraphs 2 (a) and 2 (b) of resolution 1390 (2002). The Group hopes that this will encourage and assist States in providing the Committee with information relevant to maintaining and updating the list. These procedures should also serve to alleviate concerns that some Member countries have expressed about the need to consider humanitarian factors in determining whether to provide the Committee with information relating to the possible listing of individuals or entities. The Group is aware that the Committee is seized of the matter of humanitarian exceptions.

21. The new guidelines indicate that proposed additions to the list should include, to the extent possible, a narrative description of the information that forms the basis and/or justification for a listing. The Group believes that it would be very useful if countries would indicate, at the time of listing, whether any warrants for arrest have been issued regarding the persons named. The Committee should continue to solicit such information from Member countries regarding those persons already on the list.[1] The Committee should also consider providing such information, along with other information provided to it at the time of listing, to all countries, as this may assist them in better carrying out their obligations under paragraph 2 of resolution 1390 (2002).

22. The Group has observed that in many cases the list is not reaching quickly enough the officials who need the information contained therein so that they can effectively use it for the intended purpose. The Group again emphasizes the importance of ensuring that the list is adequately communicated to States and quickly and widely distributed within States. The Group has found in several instances that countries lacked up-to-date information regarding the list or were using lists that were out of date. The Group recommends that each updated or amended list be communicated directly, immediately and simultaneously, as soon as the amendments are approved by the Committee.

V. Freezing of financial and economic assets

23. The second report of the Group provided a basic description of the financial support structure of al-Qa'idah and the measures the international community had adopted to deal with it. The present report provides an update and further elucidation regarding these measures. It also provides an indication of new developments that have come about, or become known, since the last report. This includes new strategies that al-Qa'idah and its associated entities may be utilizing to try to circumvent these international controls.

24. The global effort to combat the financing of terrorism continues to face many challenges, stemming from the complexities of international financial transactions and the uneven application of regulatory and control measures. While many countries, and their financial institutions, are adhering strictly to new international regulations and guidelines for combating money-laundering and the financing of terrorism, which is having a positive effect, many jurisdictions and financial institutions are still lagging behind.

25. The failure of States to make full use of the list has further complicated international efforts to locate, freeze and block economic and financial assets that are used to support the activities of al-Qa'idah members and their associates. The names of many individuals and certain entities that have been identified as

associated directly or indirectly with al-Qa'idah have not been submitted for inclusion on the list. Several countries have indicated that they are not able to block the assets of such persons or groups without a judicial finding. Obtaining such a finding may involve complicated investigative and evidentiary procedures. Some countries have also cited difficulty in retaining blocking orders on groups included on the list without sufficient indication that the assets are in some way directly linked to terrorism or other illegal activities. The Group notes that such de-blocking may be inconsistent with the obligations imposed by resolution 1390 (2002) and believes that Governments acting to de-block such assets should first raise this issue with the Committee.

26. The Group notes that since its last report, a number of States and regional groupings have taken new steps to further invigorate their efforts against the financing of terrorism. These measures are directly relevant to impeding the flow of funds that support al-Qa'idah and associated individuals and entities. This has included increased vigilance and more extensive use of suspicious transaction reports, as well as the introduction of new anti-money-laundering measures in several States earlier viewed as deficient. The Group of 7 reported in September 2002 that more than 160 countries and jurisdictions had taken new, concrete action to combat the financing of terrorism. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank/International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) have also significantly intensified their involvement relating to combating money-laundering and the financing of terrorism. Since February 2002, IMF has included an examination of countries' procedures to combat money-laundering and the financing of terrorism as part of the Financial Sector Assessment Programmes and the examination of offshore financial centres' legal, regulatory and supervisory systems. Also of interest is the announcement by the United States of America of a new reward programme offering up to $5 million for information that helps law enforcement officials locate and stop the flow of money to terrorists and the networks that support them.

27. New efforts are also under way in many banking capitals and centres to expand the application of stricter "know your customer" rules. This has included many banks in so-called offshore financial centres.[2] Significant progress has reportedly been achieved in Cyprus, Gibraltar, Hong Kong (China), Panama and Singapore. Other countries and jurisdictions now cooperating with the IMF assessment processes include Anguilla, Barbados, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, the Cook Islands, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Jersey, Labuan (Malaysia), Liechtenstein, Malta, the Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Monaco, the Netherlands Antilles, Samoa, Seychelles, the Bahamas, the Turks and Caicos Islands and Vanuatu. Antigua and Barbuda, Nauru, Niue, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines have been encouraged also to permit such IMF assessments as soon as possible.[3]

28. The Wolfsberg Group of Banks announced on 5 November 2002 that it intended to apply stricter "know your customer" guidelines to its own banking practices and to its handling of correspondent banking relationships. These new rules will bar business with "shell" banks and establish stringent new standards of due diligence based on evaluated risk assessments and transaction profiling. Such profiling would include criteria related to previous activities and relationships, domicile, ownership and management structure, and business portfolio (see annex IV).

29. The Wolfsberg Group has also proposed the development and regulatory endorsement of an international registry of financial institutions. Upon registering, financial institutions would submit information relevant to due diligence requirements, such as details of ownership, capital structure and key relationships. Such a step is to be strongly encouraged.

30. New emphasis is also being placed by several major banking countries on Financial Action Task Force (FATF) special recommendation VII (see annex IV), which relates to wire transfers. FATF has issued a new proposal for an interpretive note to ensure that basic information identifying the originator of fund transfers is obtained and preserved by banks and intermediaries, and that such information is made rapidly available to law enforcement and other appropriate authorities for the purpose of investigating, prosecuting and tracing the assets of terrorists or other criminals. The Group would like to see the FATF proposal for an interpretive note quickly adopted and implemented by all countries and banking jurisdictions.

31. The settlement of international transactions is usually handled through correspondent banking relationships or large-value message and payment systems, such as the SWIFT, Fedwire or CHIPS systems in the United States of America. Such international clearance centres are critical to processing international banking transactions and are rich with payment information. The United States has begun to apply new monitoring techniques to spot and verify suspicious transactions. The Group recommends the adoption of similar mechanisms by other countries.

32. The Group has also taken note of new measures to strengthen regional and international cooperation in cutting off terrorist funding. This has included new measures being taken, or pledged, on the part of Governments and financial institutions in Asia, including South-East Asia, and the Middle East. In September 2002, the Finance Ministers of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Economies announced a joint Action Plan on Combating the Financing of Terrorism, directed at strengthening regional cooperation and information-sharing regarding terrorist assets and financing. Similarly, the Association of South-East Asian Nations countries have pledged to work closely together to combat the financing of terrorism. A special conference on combating the financing of terrorism will be held in Bali this December to finalize new cooperative arrangements.

33. Although banks and financial institutions around the world are applying many of these new steps, serious gaps remain. FATF has identified several countries that continue not to cooperate with its recommended measures dealing with money-laundering and the financing of terrorism. The FATF non-cooperating country list includes the Cook Islands, Egypt, Grenada, Guatemala, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nauru, Nigeria, the Philippines, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Ukraine.[4] In addition, several countries that have adopted FATF and IBRD guidelines continue to lack the structures, resources or political will to adequately apply and enforce them. This is also the case for a number of countries and banks in Africa, Central, South and South-East Asia and the Middle East.[5] Al-Qa'idah and its associates continue to make use of banking transactions in such areas. These transactions are often routed through a combination of bank transfers and informal transfer mechanisms (such as *hawala*) and through multiple intermediaries in order to further obscure their origin and final destinations.[6]

34. FATF and some of its member countries are now undertaking a major new initiative to identify those countries that lack appropriate measures or are failing to

combat the financing of terrorism. It is to be hoped that this will lead to steps being taken to encourage cooperation from such countries. This will also include offers of technical and other assistance. A report on the FATF findings is expected shortly. A number of organizations and programmes are now available to countries wishing to avail themselves of such assistance to strengthen their own national financial institution monitoring systems. This includes programmes offered under the auspices of IMF, IBRD, the Office on Drugs and Crime (formerly the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention) and other international and regional organizations. Several programmes are also offered by member States on a bilateral basis.

35. The funding of al-Qa'idah and associated terrorist groups through charitable and other non-governmental organizations continues to pose one of the greatest challenges to the financial war on terrorism. The line between fund-raising activities for legitimate purposes and those related to terrorist recruitment, maintenance, indoctrination and training is often blurred. In some cases the charities and non-governmental organizations have been only "shell", or front, organizations intended to funnel money to al-Qa'idah or its associated groups or cells.[7] However, in many cases, otherwise legitimate charities have been infiltrated or used by al-Qa'idah and its associates to obtain, transfer or divert money to support their activities.

36. The capture of al-Qa'idah operatives and the dismantling of the organization's camps and bases in Afghanistan has provided substantial information on al-Qa'idah financial operations and the emphasis it placed on fund-raising through charities and other non-governmental organizations. It also used these organizations for logistic support, as a cover for employment, false documentation, travel facilitation and training. This information has focused a greater international effort on closely monitoring and regulating the potential use of charities and other associations for these purposes. Several charities and organizations have been investigated for possible al-Qa'idah ties, and freezing orders have been issued in several instances.[8] International standards regulating charities, non-governmental organizations and associations vary significantly between jurisdictions and between different legal systems. Charities in many countries have gone largely unregulated, except with regard to questions related to possible tax exemption status. In many cases charities come under official scrutiny only if accusations of fraud or embezzlement arise.

37. A special FATF group has just issued a paper on international best practices to help address these issues (see annex IV). The FATF paper recommends that charities cooperate with regulatory authorities by making their operations, budget, and programme activities as transparent as possible. It also recommends that charities and non-governmental organizations be required to maintain and use registered bank accounts to store and transfer their funds. This would better ensure that the transfer of their funds will at least be regulated through the formal banking system. Such transactions would then be subject to established suspicious transaction report and "know your customer" procedures. The paper also recommends formal selection and identification of directors and yearly independent audits of the organizations' financial activities.

38. Several of the charities and non-governmental organizations implicated in channelling funds, knowingly or unwittingly, to al-Qa'idah or associated groups or entities are based in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia and South-East Asia. In recognition of the religious and cultural importance given to acts of anonymous

charity, the relevant Governments were reluctant to tightly oversee these charities. This has particularly been the case regarding charitable programmes operating outside their jurisdiction. Several of these countries have now pledged to more closely regulate and scrutinize the activities of these charities. The Group recommends that all States establish a charities commission or similar regulatory body.

39. The Government of Saudi Arabia issued new regulations earlier this year tightening up charity oversight. It has required all charities based in Saudi Arabia since 1999 to be registered. The new requirements provide for the creation of a special oversight commission. They also require Saudi charities and other non-governmental organizations to report to the Saudi Government all activities that extend beyond Saudi Arabia. Such activities are to be closely monitored. The new regulations also encourage donations to be made only through established Saudi groups. Unfortunately, some of these approved groups have, in the past, been alleged to have provided funds, directly or indirectly, to al-Qa'idah operatives.[9] On 23 October 2002, the Saudi Government hosted a special forum on Islamic charities to discuss new regulatory measures as well as new coordinated investment and programme strategies.

40. The Government of Pakistan has also initiated several new measures to regulate charities and non-governmental organizations, including madrasas. The Pakistan Government has pledged to reform the madrasa system. The Group was informed that the new laws will provide for changes in curriculum, registration and the monitoring of finances.

41. The fight against the financing of terrorism has also benefited significantly from increased intelligence, including information obtained from captured al-Qa'idah operatives. Government sources have told the Group that these intelligence and information-gathering efforts are starting to pay off. Considerable information on al-Qa'idah operations and financing, and the operations and financing of related organizations and entities, has been obtained and analysed by intelligence services in several countries. This includes information gleaned from forensic banking investigations, from suspicious transaction reports, from seized computers and documents and from information obtained from captured al-Qa'idah associates or operatives. Some of this information has been disclosed publicly, including information obtained from Omar al-Faruq, a key financial operative in South-East Asia who was captured recently in the Philippines.

42. The information gathered has proved very useful in tracking down and unmasking al-Qa'idah and related terrorist cells in the United States of America, Europe, Pakistan, North Africa and South-East Asia, leading to a number of arrests. It has also hampered the transfer of terrorism-related funds. However, few of the bank accounts identified contained any significant amounts, and few additional assets of any value have been frozen. Nevertheless, this approach has had a major impact on the financing of terrorism and has forced al-Qa'idah to develop new strategies to hide the identity of its resources and to store and transfer funds.

43. As al-Qa'idah cells have moved towards greater decentralization, their leaders have sought also to disseminate their previously established financial networks in favour of local or regionally based systems. They are believed to have sequestered at least some of their assets in gold and other precious commodities. They may also be using gold and precious commodities as a medium of transfer. Such transactions

have been reported in the press and have been given credence in official statements by American and other government officials. However, few details have been given, and the Group has been unable to obtain any further information concerning such transactions. These assets are reportedly being stored for future requirements, such as the possible re-establishment of training and recruitment centres, if and when appropriate new "safe areas" become available to them. Reports indicate that such centres are being considered in some remote areas of South-East Asia. Other assets are believed to remain in the hands of unidentified al-Qa'idah sympathizers and supporters in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Middle East and Central and South-East Asia. There are also suggestions that some major financial donors and supporters may have broken off their ties, at least temporarily, with al-Qa'idah to avoid detection.

44. Information obtained through investigations of the attacks of 11 September 2001, from captured al-Qa'idah members and from seized records and documents, showed clearly that al-Qa'idah traditionally relied on an international network of financing that had originally been established to support the "holy war", or jihad, that was fought against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. With the crackdown taking place against this network, through increased pressure on Governments and banking institutions around the world to block such transactions, al-Qa'idah, and its associated entities, have increasingly turned to local sources of funding. Local affiliated groups and al-Qa'idah cells have become increasingly reliant on their own funding, maintenance and support. Many of the extremist fundamentalist and nationalist groups associated with al-Qa'idah were already handling their finances in this manner. They rely on local community solicitations, tap local charities (both overtly and covertly), conduct small business operations and often engage in street or petty crime. In addition, local groups have on occasion been asked to raise funds for al-Qa'idah by offering training courses for payment. Such courses included indoctrination and training in camps set up by al-Qa'idah for this purpose, including former camps operated in Mindanao (Philippines) and Poso, Sulawesi (Indonesia).

45. While al-Qa'idah's principal financial support network may appear somewhat dormant, it still remains operational. Al-Qa'idah appears to still have access to substantial funding from its previously established investments, non-governmental organization and charitable support network, and deep-pocket supporters. Al-Qa'idah funds are still being generated to support major operations, such as the Bali bombing[10] and the plot to blow up embassies in Singapore. In addition, the traditional network of non-governmental organizations, charities and private donors that supported extremist institutions and proselytizing activities in support of al-Qa'idah and its objectives in the past remains active. While these latter funds are ostensibly for (and do go largely to) legitimate religious, humanitarian, social and educational purposes, they are also being used to fund radical extremist movements that support al-Qa'idah recruitment and indoctrination efforts.

46. Intelligence information has also provided a clearer picture of al-Qa'idah's involvement in developing or aligning itself with other radical extremist groups in South-East Asia, including Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. This has included substantial financial assistance and terrorism-related expertise. Relationships were first established in the late 1980s, followed by the establishment of a logistics base in the Philippines in the early 1990's. This base was believed to have been financed in large part by funds received through charities and specially established front companies, allegedly set up by Osama bin Laden's

brother-in-law, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa. Khalifa, a regional director for the Saudi-based charity International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), was married to a Filipina from Mindanao. Subsequent intelligence reports indicated that IIRO was used as a "pipeline" for bankrolling local militants. It is estimated that a substantial amount of IIRO funding to the region was diverted to terrorist-related activities. This included support for fundamentalist schools and centres and for recruiting promising young cadres who were then sent to centres in Pakistan and Afghanistan for further indoctrination. Al-Qa'idah is also alleged to have provided funding for training and arms.

47. External funding and support from legitimate charities and illicit funding channelled through al-Qa'idah operations and front companies continue to flow to groups linked to radical elements throughout the South-East Asia region. Regulating this funding is a very delicate and difficult issue. South-East Asia is home to about a fifth of the world's Muslim population, and many areas rely heavily on funding from local and international charities to support their religious, humanitarian, economic, social and educational activities. The population and local governments are likely to be wary of any attempts to interfere with the local work of such charities or organizations. The answer must therefore lie in more intense self-regulation supported by national and local government authorities. There will also have to be more careful oversight of sources of funding from outside the region.

48. Financial regulatory authorities have also focused greater attention on informal transfer mechanisms, such as *hawala*. Al-Qa'idah is believed to rely increasingly on such informal mechanisms to transmit funds for support and operational purposes. This is a result, in part, of increased vigilance over traditional bank transfers and the increased ability of law enforcement agencies in a number of countries to trace such transactions. It is also attributable to the absence of formal banking mechanisms in a number of areas in Pakistan and Afghanistan and remote areas of South-East Asia where al-Qa'idah and related organizations are now operating.

49. The legal status of *hawala* systems differs from country to country. Several countries treat *hawala* and similar transfer arrangements under their regular banking regulations or under a special regulatory category reserved for such transfer facilities. They are subjected to registration requirements and reporting and oversight rules. Many countries require such transfer agencies to "know their customers" and to file suspicious transaction reports. This is usually the case in North America and Europe. Some countries have established more liberal regulatory regimes for such informal transfer mechanisms. Others do not regulate *hawala* or have simply declared such systems illegal.

50. Whatever the regulatory regime, there is growing recognition that unregulated *hawala*-like operations exist in many countries. It is estimated that, at a minimum, tens of billions of dollars flow through *hawala* and other informal value transfer systems on an annual basis. Many countries have therefore stepped up their policing and enforcement of such practices. Others are now taking the first step to regulate such activities. As an example, the Group has noted the announcement by the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates, on 5 November 2002, that all *hawala* transfers would be subject to reporting requirements. Each such transaction would have to be recorded and reported to the United Arab Emirates Government banking regulatory authority. *Hawala* operators or *hawaladars* will be required to provide the Central Bank with details regarding those sending and receiving money transfers

both originating in and coming into the country. The Group also noted the regulations that the Pakistan Government indicated it intends to implement with respect to *hawala* transfer systems.

VI. Travel ban

51. Al-Qa'idah has demonstrated its ability to organize attacks over a wide range of targets, means, modes and geographical areas, indicating the continued mobility and flexibility of the network. Elements of the networks appear able to move with relative ease within their areas of operation, e.g., Europe and South-East Asia, or between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Group has noted the increasing cooperation and coordination between intelligence and law enforcement agencies of different States and encourages these countries to continue to reinforce these efforts.

52. One of the key tools available to restrict the movement of al-Qa'idah is the list, if used effectively by all States to implement the travel ban. Nevertheless, some States are not including designated individuals from the list in their national stop lists. Whereas the Group appreciates that it is highly unlikely that designated individuals will try to travel using documents in their own names, if they are aware of gaps in the system they might well be encouraged to exploit them.

53. Another problem that still exists, highlighted in the Group's previous report,[11] concerns the action to be taken in the event that a designated individual is stopped either attempting to enter or transiting a State. It is the Group's opinion that individuals designated on the list must be terrorists or suspected terrorists and must be apprehended. They should then be sent to their country of origin or to the country where they have been indicted.

54. It has been suggested to the Group that, with regard to the travel ban, the list is seen by some States merely as a political gesture. In relation to al-Qa'idah and its network, this is a very dangerous premise. Despite the difficulty of imposing such a travel ban, the identification and curtailing of al-Qa'idah mobility is an essential element for combating its terrorism. Previous travel bans have been imposed on members of political regimes or particular figures, restricting their movement to a specific geographical area. The al-Qa'idah network is not a geographically defined political movement and therefore cannot be compared with regimes previously subjected to travel sanctions. In addition, al-Qa'idah has a terrorist network of global proportions, not restricted by national boundaries. If the fight against the al-Qa'idah network is to be effective, the movement of listed individuals must also be restricted, even within States. Consequently, the resolution 1390 (2002) travel ban, in its present form, is not a strong enough deterrent measure against the al-Qa'idah network.

55. The Group is aware of the problems of illegal immigrants and the flow of asylum-seekers into Europe and North America. Organized crime syndicates have established effective illegal immigration routes by which large numbers of human beings can be smuggled. This has become a very lucrative business for the criminal gangs involved.[12] Some of the border officials with whom the Group spoke indicated their concern that terrorists might resort to this method of illegal movement to slip into their territory, as highlighted in the Group's previous report.[13]

56. The Group was given a detailed briefing by officials of the Schengen Information System command centre at Strasbourg. The Schengen area was created essentially to provide freedom of movement of persons between participating States. The Schengen Information System also provides a means by which law enforcement agencies of participating States can trace indicted criminals or persons suspected of committing a crime, even though the suspects may have crossed national boundaries within the Schengen area.

57. The Schengen Information System works extremely well in its present form for its intended and agreed purpose. This was clearly demonstrated to the Group. However, it does not have the legal provisions to meet the requirements of a travel ban such as that stipulated in resolution 1390 (2002). Consequently, implementation of the resolution is and has been agreed to be the responsibility of each individual participating State under its obligations to the United Nations. However, as there are now, for the purposes of the Schengen Agreement, no borders between members of the Schengen area, it appears to the Group that the participating States are not able to comply fully with paragraph 2 (b) of resolution 1390 (2002).

VII. Arms embargo

58. Monitoring the arms embargo is still the most complex and challenging element in the tasks assigned to the Group. The Group has seen very little progress in this field. Although the Group does not have specific evidence concerning arms and explosives reaching al-Qa'idah or its associated entities, there is sufficient information to confirm that al-Qa'idah has access to weapons, ammunition and explosives. The arms embargo set out in paragraph 2 (c) of resolution 1390 (2002) is falling short.

59. Recent events have demonstrated clearly that al-Qa'idah and its associates continue to make use of substantial quantities of explosives, despite the stringent arms control regulations many States have in place. The Bali and Mombasa bombings and the *Limburg* attack are, unfortunately, perfect illustrations of this. The recent arrest of a senior al-Qa'idah member who confessed to planning two more attacks in Yemen and, according to Western intelligence sources, the global threat of more attacks to come, including attacks on shipping, show that al-Qa'idah is well armed and prepared to retake the initiative.

60. Al-Qa'idah members and their associates continue to acquire large quantities of explosives or the necessary ingredients to make them. In addition to the acquisition of materials for the Bali bombings, there are numerous examples of explosives or their components being purchased on the open or black market. For instance, in late January 2002 the Philippine police arrested Fathur Rohman al Ghozi, an Indonesian terrorist linked to al-Qa'idah, and reported the seizure of one ton of TNT, 17 M-16 rifles and 300 detonators.[14] Two months later, the Philippine police seized approximately 16 tons of nitric acid, a primary ingredient in making bombs, from a trader in Valenzuela City. In March the Philippine navy seized a cargo of 15,235 kilograms of ammonium nitrate in Zamboanga without, surprisingly, making any arrests.[15] In Malaysia, a former Malaysian army captain, Yazid Sufaat, was arrested after the Malaysian police discovered that he had ordered no less than four tons of ammonium nitrate, a common fertilizer that, when mixed with motor spirit, becomes a powerful low-cost explosive and is often used by suicide

bombers.[16] These examples are only the tip of the iceberg and are provided to demonstrate the relative ease with which terrorists are able to get access to basic explosives.

61. The international community has brought forth two conventions directed at controlling the availability, manufacture and use of explosives and the ingredients for making them: the Montreal Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, of March 1991, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, of December 1997.

62. The Montreal Convention requires the parties to adopt measures to prohibit the manufacture of unmarked explosives and to impose strict controls over the movement of such explosives. The Convention also requires the parties to destroy, consume, mark or render permanently ineffective all stocks of unmarked explosives within three years if not held by military or police authorities and within 15 years if held by military or police authorities.

63. Under the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, parties are requested to adapt their domestic legislation to be able to prevent acts of terrorism, to prosecute or extradite perpetrators and to fully cooperate with other parties in the prevention of such acts. Furthermore, the parties shall inform the United Nations Secretary-General of offenders who have been prosecuted. This last measure, if effectively applied, could provide a further source of al-Qa'idah names for the list.

64. Taken together, these two Conventions provide an array of tools that, if effectively applied by States, could significantly reduce the availability of explosives and their use by terrorists in general and by al-Qa'idah in particular. To date, only 87 countries have ratified the 1991 Convention and only 75 the 1997 Convention. In order to restrict al-Qa'idah's access to, and use of, explosive materials and their components, all States are strongly encouraged to become parties to both Conventions.

65. Another positive step is the Container Security Initiative, introduced by the United States of America in cooperation with a number of international port transfer zones and terminals. Greater container security and inspection are crucial for controlling the transfer of arms and explosives. While the cost of introducing the necessary inspection equipment is significant, it can be amortized over time. This financial burden needs to be shared by all international trans-shipment ports.

66. Another area of concern is the apparent lack of oversight of the production and commercialization of explosives and explosive ingredients. In fact, the world appears to be so awash in explosives that terrorists find it relatively easy to obtain what they need on the black market or sometimes in a loosely regulated legal one. Improved oversight is essential to gaining a handle on this problem. Effective oversight can eliminate undesired surpluses. An example of the results achieved through effective controls of the sort envisaged by the Group was the confiscation by the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms of 4.2 million pounds of explosives from the factory of the Slurry Explosive Corporation, following the discovery of excess production. The company was licensed to store a maximum of 90,000 pounds of explosives.[17] The Group does not wish to imply that these explosives would have been used to commit terrorist attacks, but to point out

that overproduction of explosives creates a real danger of diversion to undesired elements.

67. Members of the Group had the opportunity to visit the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan and to learn first hand about the availability and movement of weaponry there. This is a particularly volatile region, in part because of the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. It therefore merits particularly close attention.

68. There are growing indications that traffickers are smuggling light weapons out of Afghanistan into neighbouring Pakistan. These arms are widely available to members of al-Qa'idah and associated groups, some of whom are believed to be sheltered or taking shelter in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas or certain major conurbations. According to a statement attributed to the Pakistan Ministry of Defence, 475 hauls of weapons, including more than 2,000 rockets, 4,000 land mines and 5 million bullets have been seized in 2002.[18]

69. The Pakistan authorities informed the Group that they consider their country a victim of the successive Afghanistan wars. Weapons from Afghanistan are regularly streaming into Pakistan across the porous 2,538-kilometre border. They do not believe that weapons are transiting their country to Afghanistan. Pakistani authorities noted that there are more than enough arms and ammunition inside Afghanistan, which had been supplied in support of the war against the Soviet occupation, to sustain guerrilla forces for years to come.

70. During discussions on this subject, the Group highlighted the fact that many of the weapons and much of the ammunition left by the Soviets had been kept in such poor conditions that the coalition forces had no choice but to destroy the caches in situ, because the items were unstable or to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands. Reports emanating from the United States Department of Defense indicate that some quantities of new weapons and ammunition had been discovered inside Afghanistan. Responding to these reports, the Pakistan authorities told the Group that, if so, only small quantities of weapons and ammunition would be involved, and they would have come from other States bordering Afghanistan, not from Pakistan. The Group has not yet had the opportunity to corroborate these allegations with any representative of the coalition forces.

71. In view of these weapons flows, the Group asked the Pakistan Government to furnish details of specific cases in which arms flowing into Pakistan had been seized. This included the recent seizure near Zhob, in Baluchistan province, by the Baluchistan Levies, of a vehicle loaded with a large quantity of ammunition and explosive material, including 100 kilograms of TNT, 178 82-millimetre mortar rounds, 25 75-millimetre recoilless rifle projectiles and 55 82-millimetre (mortar) fuses.[19] The ongoing investigations have yet to yield a response to this request. Similarly, the anti-smuggling unit of the customs service at Quetta seized a large quantity of arms and ammunition from Mazari Pass, close to the border between Pakistan and south-west Afghanistan. The unit successfully recovered four rocket launchers, one light machine gun, one 7.62 rifle and 400 rounds of 12.7-millimetre anti-aircraft ammunition. These items had been dumped in a hilly area of Mazari Pass outside a small border village. The customs authorities declared that some smugglers had dumped arms and ammunition near the Pakistan/Afghanistan border, at Nok-Kundi, for smuggling into the interior for terrorist activities.[20] It is not clear for whom these weapons were intended. It is proving quite difficult for the Pakistani authorities to control the movement of weapons into the Tribal Areas.

72. According to the *Small Arms Survey 2002*, there are some 2 million weapons in Pakistan in the hands of legally licensed owners. Officials of the Pakistan Ministry of Interior believe that there are approximately 18 million illegally held weapons. Gun ownership is, historically, more common in the border regions of Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province than in the rest of the country; these are places where "firearms owners typically have more than one gun, often as many as half a dozen".[21] Consequently, one cannot overlook the possibility of some of these guns falling into the hands of the remnants of the Taliban or members of al-Qa'idah.

73. Similarly, there are small towns and villages along the Afghan/Pakistani border, such as Darra Adamkhel, which are renowned for their illicit weapons production. While the production of these arms is looked upon by some as a local craft and the weapons produced are considered to be of low quality, they still provide a low-cost option and enhance the accessibility of weapons in the region.

74. The Tribal Areas along the Pakistan border with Afghanistan have a history of resisting external regulation. There the international community is facing a cultural and ancestral tradition. It is part of the way of life of the inhabitants of this region to be armed, and the smuggling routes are not on any maps near any roads. They are part of a cultural heritage transmitted through generations. This porous border is conducive to smuggling.

75. As Jayantha Dhanapala, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, stated to the Security Council on 11 October 2002, "there is growing evidence of close links between illicit small arms and light weapons and both terrorism and drug trafficking".[22] In this regard, the Group is concerned that the proceeds, based on an average price of $350 per kilogram and an opium harvest estimated at 3,000 tons, could amount to about $1 billion. The Office on Drugs and Crime report[23] has estimated that about 68 per cent of the projected harvest will come from areas that the Group understands are traditionally sympathetic to the Taliban. Consequently, the opportunities for the Taliban and al-Qa'idah to benefit financially and for there to be funds available for the purchase of more weaponry should be a major concern. Undoubtedly, many warlords and other tribal leaders benefit from this trade, as might al-Qa'idah.

76. While in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Group visited the country's borders with Afghanistan and with Pakistan, travelling along approximately 150 kilometres of the actual border patrol routes with units of the Iranian Border Guard Service. Iran has gone to considerable lengths to control movement across its border, particularly that section of its border with Afghanistan, in order to combat drug trafficking. The country has suffered many casualties in this endeavour. Despite the fact that the drug smugglers are well armed and well equipped, the Iranian authorities have as yet encountered little evidence of weapons being funnelled into Afghanistan through their country.

77. During clashes with the drug smugglers, Iranian border guards have seized small arms and light support weapons, ranging from the basic AK-47 assault rifle to automatic grenade launchers, heavy machine guns (14.5-millimetre), and shoulder-fired anti-tank and anti-aircraft missile systems. They have also seized modern Japanese radio transceivers and United States-manufactured night vision equipment. Bearing in mind the areas inside Afghanistan from which the majority of the

traffickers are emanating, the likelihood of elements of the Taliban and al-Qa'idah once again having easy access to weapons and drug proceeds cannot be ignored.

78. Recent reports from intelligence services indicate that al-Qa'idah is regrouping and setting up simple training facilities inside Afghanistan, close to the Pakistan border. This would suggest that al-Qa'idah will probably require additional arms and ammunition.

79. The Group's report of 15 January 2002 pursuant to resolution 1363 (2001) (S/2001/65, annex), included a recommendation that the Security Council consider imposing an arms embargo on the whole of Afghanistan, with the exception of the legitimate government forces. Following the Group's visits to Iran and Pakistan, it is more convinced than ever of the need for such a measure. This important step would reinforce the efforts being undertaken by the Iranian and Pakistani Governments to control the flow of weapons across their borders with Afghanistan.

80. The Group also looked into the flow of arms to Jemaah Islamiyah and other al-Qa'idah-related groups in South-East Asia. This included being briefed by the relevant authorities and experts in the field. They indicated that, contrary to the information in the Group's last report, which stated that weapons were flowing to these groups from the Golden Triangle, the information at their disposal indicated that weapons were being provided locally. Weapons were being obtained from the local black market, from the looting of military dumps and from corrupted servicemen. The Group is continuing to look into this matter.

81. Regarding weapons of mass destructions, the Group remains highly preoccupied by the potential for al-Qa'idah to manufacture some kind of "dirty" bomb. In that respect, the attention of the Group has been drawn to the recent seizure by the Tanzanian police of 110 kilograms of suspected raw uranium, a highly radioactive and dangerous material. In recent months, the Tanzanian authorities have seized five canisters of suspected uranium. This material is usually smuggled from the neighbouring countries through the Tanzanian border towns of Mbeya in the south, Kigoma in the west and Rukwa in the south-west.

82. The Group wishes to emphasize that so far no connection has been identified between the events in the United Republic of Tanzania and al-Qa'idah. However, the possibility cannot be excluded of these illegal movements of raw uranium reaching al-Qa'idah or its associates in East Africa. The Group is following this line of inquiry with the Tanzanian authorities and maintaining contact on this matter with the International Atomic Energy Agency Department of Safeguards.

83. The Group is cognizant of a number of press and other reports that al-Qa'idah is interested in acquiring chemical weapons. Currently the Group has no further information to contribute, but hopes to be able to devote some of its time in the future to this issue.

84. The Group has noted with satisfaction that, following its previous reports, certain States have introduced modifications in their legislation requiring the registration of arms brokers. Other measures to control brokering activities, including brokering by nationals outside the jurisdiction, have also been put in place by certain States. The Group hopes that additional States will also adopt such measures.

85. The Group also notes with keen interest the 12 recommendations incorporated in the report of the Secretary-General on small arms,[24] which are fully consistent with and support the recommendations presented in the Group's previous reports. In this regard, the Group believes that consideration should also be given to the application of "know your customer" rules similar to those now being applied by international financial institutions. Weapons traders should be required to exercise due diligence to identify and confirm the bona fides of their clients. Suspicious transactions should be reported immediately to the appropriate authorities.

VIII. Conclusions

86. After a year of monitoring the implementation by States of resolution 1390 (2002) and discussing with Governments the measures imposed under the resolution, the Group has come to the following conclusions:

87. The effective implementation by a number of States of some of the measures in resolution 1390 (2002) has had a positive impact in terms of reducing the operational capability of al-Qa'idah.

88. Al-Qa'idah appears to have suffered some significant disruption to its infrastructure, but due to its decentralized, loose and relatively simple command and control system and inherent flexibility, it continues to pose a substantial threat, globally, to peace and security.

89. The United Nations consolidated list suffers from a number of inadequacies, which require rectification in order for States to comply more effectively. Similarly, States as a whole need to be more proactive in submitting names and supporting information to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999).

90. The measures to freeze financial and economic assets have had a positive impact in terms of disrupting al-Qa'idah's financial support, forcing al-Qa'idah to find alternative methods of funding and move its finances. Consequently, it has become more difficult to trace and identify the network's assets. Greater reliance is being placed on intelligence-gathering and the sharing of information, and this is beginning to produce positive results.

91. The travel ban under resolution 1390 (2002) is based predominantly on previously established United Nations travel bans. It is not configured to counter a global terrorist network such as al-Qa'idah.

92. The arms embargo, when initiated, had a geographical visibility. The global dispersion of the al-Qa'idah network has significantly changed the scale of the arms embargo that has to be implemented, to such an extent that the stipulated measures now fall short of the target.

93. The resolution has provided a good foundation for international cooperation in the fight against al-Qa'idah, and significant progress has been achieved. Nevertheless, the implementation of the measures contained in the resolution does not appear to have been sufficiently effective. Countering the al-Qa'idah network effectively will demand a more proactive approach to the formulation and implementation of the resolution by all Member States.

IX. Recommendations

94. The recommendations that follow are in addition to those already made in the Monitoring Group's two previous reports.

United Nations consolidated list

95. The Group recommends that the list be issued in its revised format without further delay.

96. Member States should submit to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) the names of all individuals and entities associated with al-Qa'idah whose identities have been released publicly.

97. All individuals known to have attended al-Qa'idah training camps in Afghanistan, or any other locations associated with the al-Qa'idah network, must be considered suspected terrorists and their names submitted for designation on the list.

98. Updated versions of the list must be communicated to all Member States immediately and simultaneously, by a recognized legal means.

Freezing of financial and economic assets

99. Assets attributable to individuals and entities on the list should not be released without prior approval from the Committee, in accordance with the guidelines issued by the Committee.

100. Member States should be encouraged to introduce mechanisms to enable electronic transfers, particularly international ones, to be effectively monitored for suspicious transactions. Attention should be given to FATF special recommendation VII and the new interpretive note being circulated for adoption.

101. Member States should establish appropriate regulatory authorities in order to ensure the effective oversight of charities and non-governmental organizations.

102. Member States should establish the appropriate regulatory authorities to monitor the activities of informal transfer mechanisms such as *hawala*.

Travel ban

103. The Group suggests that the Committee consider all those individuals designated on the list al-Qa'idah terrorists or suspected al-Qa'idah terrorists, in order that Member States can detain, prosecute or extradite them to another country that has issued a warrant or return them for detention in their country of origin.

104. Member States should ensure that they put in place the appropriate measures to fully comply with paragraph 2 (b) of resolution 1390 (2002).

Arms embargo

105. All Member States should be encouraged to become party to the 1991 Montreal Convention and the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings.

106. Member States should be encouraged to participate in the Container Security Initiative.

107. Member States should be encouraged to adopt, where appropriate, the 12 recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General on small arms dated 20 September 2002.[24]

Notes

[1] To date the Committee has received 11 replies to its initial request dated 23 September 2002.

[2] There are more than 40 such banking centres where modern telecommunications allow banks to operate from offshore branch locations with little or no oversight.

[3] See note on offshore financial centres prepared by the Monetary and Exchange Department of the International Monetary Fund, 31 October 2002.

[4] Russia, Dominica, Niue and the Marshall Islands were removed from the FATF non-cooperating list on 11 October 2002 on indication that significant reforms to their anti-money-laundering systems were under way (see FATF press release dated 11 October 2002).

[5] "In the Middle East, for example, the Gulf Cooperation Council, which comprises Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, has agreed to be bound by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations on money-laundering and terrorist financing. Yet, over the past year, few of these countries have enforced these measures .... In Africa, Central Asia and the Caucasus, the problem is due to an extreme lack of financial oversight procedures, laws and institutions, rather than political resistance. Banks in these regions generally operate on a largely informal basis with a staff ill-equipped to identify money-laundering or other suspicious transactions" (Center for Defense Information Primer: Terrorist Finances, 25 October 2002).

[6] Reports have circulated indicating that about $127,000 was routed in this fashion to fund recent al-Qa'idah operations in Yemen (al-Jazeerah Arabic News, 11 November 2002).

[7] One such example is the Afghan Support Committee, which was established by al-Qa'idah to funnel money directly to al-Qa'idah operations. Al-Qa'idah is also believed to have used such front organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina to re-route funds to the al-Qa'idah organization or associated groups.

[8] A partial list of the charities and non-governmental organizations whose assets have been blocked for terrorism funding or related activities includes the Afghan Support Committee, the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Somalia branches), the Makhtab al-Khidamat, a clearing house for Islamic charities financed directly by Osama bin Laden, the Al Rashid Trust, the Wafa Humanitarian Organization, the Rabita trust, the Global Relief Foundation, the Benevolence International Foundation, the Aid Organization of the Ulema, Jam'yah Ta'awun al-Islamia and the Somali International Relief Organization.

[9] There are 241 charitable societies in Saudi Arabia with a combined revenue of 1.2 billion riyals and expenditures of about 970 million riyals. Last year Saudi Arabia participated with the United States of America in designating the Somali and Bosnian branch offices of one of its principal charitable organizations, Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, which had been found to have been engaged in activities in support of al-Qa'idah. The Saudi Government also acted jointly with the United States in September 2002 to designate a Saudi national, Wa'el Hamza Julaidan, who had served as a Director-General of another Saudi charity, the Rabita Trust.

[10] At least one credible source has alleged that a donor provided some $74,000 to purchase explosives for use by extremist groups in the region. Funds for the purchase of the van and other items allegedly came in cash and electronic transfers.

[11] See S/2002/1050, enclosure, para. 77.

[12] *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 1 December 2002, "Immigration criminals may aid terrorists": "The larger gangs are making up to GBP 1m [$1.6 million] a week through smuggling people into the United Kingdom, the Unit [the United Kingdom organized immigration crime unit] says".

[13] "There are also reports that al-Qa'idah members have sought to enter Europe using well-established illegal immigration routes, including those extending from Central Asia, as well as from Turkey and the Balkans into the rest of Europe" (S/2002/1050, enclosure, para. 72).

[14] *The Manila Times*, 18 March 2002, "PNP inventory unearths 2-ton missing explosives".

[15] Ibid., 23 March 2002, "Cops seize big shipment of explosives ingredients from Valenzuela trader".

[16] *The Bulletin*, 13 February 2002, "SE Asia, the Devil's playground".

[17] *The Joplin Globe*, 3 August 2002, "Explosives plant prepares to resume production — federal criminal probe continues, officials say".

[18] Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Afghan Recovery Report, 1 November 2002, "Taliban buying up smuggled guns".

[19] *The News*, 30 October 2002.

[20] Ibid., "Quetta Customs seize arms".

[21] *Small Arms Survey 2002* (Oxford University Press, New York), p. 100.

[22] See S/PV.4623.

[23] Afghanistan Opium Survey 2002, October 2002.

[24] S/2002/1053.

Annex I

Chronology of al-Qa'idah-related terrorist incidents since 9 August 2002

2 October 2002	Suspected Abu Sayyaf guerrillas detonate a nail-laden bomb in an open-air market in Zamboanga, Philippines. Persons killed: 3
6 October 2002	Attack on the French-registered supertanker *Limburg* off the coast of Yemen. Persons killed: 1
8 October 2002	Two armed men open fire on United States Marines training on Kuwait's Failaka island. Persons killed: 1
12 October 2002	A car bomb explodes outside a crowded nightclub in Bali, Indonesia. The powerful explosion causes the nightclub to go up in flames. Persons killed: 191
24 October 2002	A heavily armed group of about 40 storms a crowded theatre in Moscow and takes more than 700 hostages. The group demands an end to the war in Chechnya. In the early morning hours of 26 October Russian special forces enter the theatre and kill most of the hostage-takers. As a result of the use of a gas a large number of hostages die as well. Persons killed: 129 hostages 41 hostage-takers
28 November 2002	Missiles are fired at a commercial airliner taking off from Mombasa airport in Kenya. The missiles narrowly miss the aircraft, which lands safely in Tel Aviv, Israel. Persons killed: none
28 November 2002	A car bombing is carried out against a hotel in Mombasa, Kenya. Persons killed: 13 people in the hotel 3 suicide bombers

Annex II

Individuals, publicly identified, allegedly linked with al-Qa'idah

1	Ab Wahab bin Ahmad	46	Kamel Daudi
2	Abd al-Aziz al-Jamal	47	Kamel Lakhram
3	Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri	48	Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
4	Abdallah M'safer ali Al Ghamdi	49	Mahfuh bin Haji Halimi
5	Abdel Tobichi	50	Mahmoud bin Ahmad Assegaf
6	Abdelghani Mzoudi	51	Midhat Mursi
7	Abdul Majid s/o Niaz Mohamed	52	Mohamad Anaur bin Margono
8	Abdulbasit Usman	53	Mohamed Boualem Khnouni
9	Abou Doha aka Amar Makhlilif	54	Mohamed Ellias s/o Mohd.Khan
10	Abu Bakr Basyr	55	Mohamed Haider Zammar
11	Abu Basir al- Yemeni	56	Mohamed Khalim bin Jaffar
12	Abu Mohammed Al-Masri	57	Mohamed Mansur Jabrah
13	Abu Musab Zarqawi	58	Mohamed Nazir bin Mohamed Uthman
14	Abu Zubair al Haili	59	Mohamed Noor bin Sulaimi
15	Adham A. Hassoun	60	Mohammaed Jamil Derbah
16	Adnan bin Musa	61	Mohammed Asraf
17	Agus Dwikarna	62	Mohammed Bensakhira
18	Ahmed Brahim	63	Mohammed Galeb Zouayadi
19	Amrozi	64	Mohammed Hisham bin Hairi
20	Andrew Gerard a.k.a. Ali Ridhaa bin Abdullah	65	Mohammed Jamal Khalifa
21	Azman bin Jalani	66	Mohd Jauhari bin Abdullah
22	Eddin Barakat Yarkas	67	Mohsen al-Fadhil
23	Faiz Abdullah Ashiblie	68	Momar Timbao Esmael
24	Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana	69	Muhammad Saad Iqwal Madni
25	Fathi Abu Bakar Bafana	70	Muhammed Abid Afridi
26	Feroz Abbasi	71	Mukhlas a.k.a. Ali Gufron
27	Ghulam Mustafa Rama	72	Mullah Krekar
28	Gulbuddin Hekmatiyar	73	Munain bin Turru
29	Habibullah s/o Hameed	74	Nabil al-Marabh
30	Haji Ibrahim b Haji Maidin	75	Naharudin bin Sabtu
31	Hakim Mokhfi	76	Nicolas Belloni
32	Halim bin Hussain	77	Nizar Trablesi
33	Hamadi Bouyahia	78	Nordin bin Parman
34	Hashim bin Abas	79	Omar Al-Faruq
35	Hassan Al-Cheguer	80	Omar Shishani
36	Hilal Aouad Alassiri	81	Othman bin Mohamed
37	Husin bin Ab Aziz	82	Rabah Kadri aka Toufiq
38	Ilyas Ali	83	Redouane Daoud
39	Imam Samudra	84	Richard Reed
40	Ja'afar bin Mistooki	85	Riduan Isamuddin (hambali)
41	Jamal Beghal	86	Saad Bin Laden

42	James Ujaama	87	Said bin Ismail
43	Jerome Courtailler	88	Said Kazdari
44	Jose Padilla	89	Sajahan bin Abdul Rahman
45	Kamal Hadid Chaar	90	Sakim bin Marwan
91	Sanin bin Raffin	98	Yachine Akhnouche
92	Simon bin Sabtu	99	Yasser Al-Siri
93	Slimane Khalfaoui	100	Yazid Sufaat
94	Suleiman Abu Ghaith	101	Zacarias Moussaoui
95	Syed Ibrahim	102	Zaid Khayr
96	Syed Mustajab	103	Zuher Hilal Mohamed Al Tbaiti
97	Tawfiq Attash Khallad	104	Zulkifli bin Mohamed Jaffar

Annex III

Guidelines of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) for the conduct of its work, adopted on 7 November 2002

1. The 1267 Committee

The Committee of the Security Council established by paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999 and whose functions were modified by resolution 1390 (2002) of 16 January 2002, will be known as the 1267 Committee.

The Committee is a subsidiary organ of the Security Council.

2. Composition of the Committee

(a) The Committee will consist of all members of the Security Council.

(b) The Chairman of the Committee will be appointed by the Security Council. The Chairman of the Committee will be assisted by two Vice-Chairmen, who will be appointed by the Security Council.

(c) The Chairman will chair meetings of the Committee. When he is unable to chair a meeting, he will nominate one of the Vice-Chairmen to act on his behalf.

(d) The secretariat of the Committee will be provided by the Secretariat of the United Nations.

3. Meetings of the Committee

(a) Meetings of the Committee will be convened at any time the Chairman deems necessary, or at the request of a member of the Committee. Two working days' notice will be given for any meeting of the Committee, although shorter notice may be given in urgent situations.

(b) The Committee will meet in closed sessions, unless it decides otherwise. The Committee may invite any Member of the United Nations to participate in the discussion of any question brought before the Committee in which interests of that Member are specifically affected. The Committee may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons whom it considers competent for the purpose to supply it with appropriate expertise or information or to give it other assistance in examining matters within its competence.

(c) The Committee may invite the members of the Monitoring Group established pursuant to resolution 1363 (2001) and whose functions were modified by resolution 1390 (2002) to attend meetings as appropriate.

4. Mandate of the Committee

The mandate of the Committee will be, on the basis of the measures imposed by paragraph 4 (b) of resolution 1267 (1999) and paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1333 (2000), as extended by paragraph 1 of resolution 1390 (2002) and paragraph 2 of resolution 1390 (2002), to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations:

(a) To seek from all States further information regarding the actions taken by them with a view to effectively implementing the measures referred to above, and thereafter to request from them whatever further information the Committee may consider necessary;

(b) To update regularly the list referred to in paragraph 2 of resolution 1390 (2002), including through the designation of individuals, groups, undertakings and entities that are subject to the measures referred to above, on the basis of relevant information provided by Member States and regional organizations;

(c) To cooperate with other relevant Security Council sanctions Committees and with the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001;

(d) To examine the reports submitted by Member States pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1390 (2002) and the reports presented by the Monitoring Group pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 1390 (2002);

(e) To consider information brought to its attention by States concerning violations of the measures referred to above and to recommend appropriate measures in response thereto;

(f) To make periodic reports to the Council on information submitted to the Committee regarding the implementation of resolution 1390 (2002), including regarding violations of the measures referred to above;

(g) To make information it considers relevant, including the list referred to in paragraph 2 of resolution 1390 (2002), publicly available through the appropriate media;

(h) To amend expeditiously such guidelines and criteria as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures referred to above;

(i) To consider requests for exemptions from the measures imposed by paragraph 2 (b) of Security Council resolution 1390 (2002) in accordance with that paragraph.

5. List of individuals and entities referred to in paragraph 2 of resolution 1390 (2002)

(a) The Committee will update regularly the list referred to in paragraph 2 of resolution 1390 (2002) when it receives relevant information;

(b) Proposed additions to the list should also include, to the extent possible, a narrative description of the information that forms the basis or justification for taking action pursuant to resolution 1390 (2002) and relevant provisions of resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000);

(c) Proposed additions to the list should include, to the extent possible, relevant and specific information to facilitate their identification by competent authorities:

- For individuals: name, date of birth, place of birth, nationality, aliases, residence, passport or travel document number;

– For groups, undertakings or entities: name, acronyms, address, headquarters, subsidiaries, affiliates, fronts, nature of business or activity, leadership;

(d) The Committee will consider expeditiously requests to update the list to be provided through Member States or regional organizations, on the basis of relevant information received by the Committee;

(e) Any modification to the list will be communicated to the Member States immediately. The updated list will be made promptly available on the web pages of the Committee.

6. De-listing

(a) Without prejudice to available procedures, petitioners (individuals, groups, undertakings, and/or entities on the 1267 Committee's consolidated list) may petition the Government of residence and/or citizenship to request review of the case. In this regard, the petitioner should provide justification for the de-listing request, offer relevant information and request support for de-listing;

(b) The Government to which a petition is submitted (the petitioned Government) should review all relevant information and then approach bilaterally the Government(s) originally proposing designation (the designating Government(s)) to seek additional information and to hold consultations on the de-listing request;

(c) The original designating Government(s) may also request additional information from the petitioner's country of citizenship or residency. The petitioned and the designating Government(s) may, as appropriate, consult with the Chairman of the Committee during the course of any such bilateral consultations;

(d) If, after reviewing any additional information, the petitioned Government wishes to pursue a de-listing request, it should seek to persuade the designating Government(s) to submit jointly or separately a request for de-listing to the Committee. The petitioned Government may, without an accompanying request from the original designating Government(s), submit a request for de-listing to the Committee, pursuant to the no-objection procedure;

(e) The Committee will reach decisions by consensus of its members. If consensus cannot be reached on a particular issue, the Chairman will undertake such further consultations as may facilitate agreement. If, after these consultations, consensus still cannot be reached, the matter may be submitted to the Security Council. Given the specific nature of the information, the Chairman may encourage bilateral exchanges between interested Member States in order to clarify the issue prior to a decision.

7. Reports submitted by the Member States and information supplied to the Committee

(a) The Committee will examine the reports submitted by Member States pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1390 (2002). The Committee may request further information that it considers necessary;

(b) The Committee will examine the reports presented by the Monitoring Group pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 1390 (2002);

(c) The Committee will consider information relevant to its work, including possible violations, provided from different sources through Member States;

(d) The Secretariat will forward to the Committee any information obtained from any published sources, including radio and television broadcasts, relating to the implementation of resolution 1390 (2002) and relevant parts of resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000), and particularly violations or alleged violations of the sanctions established by these resolutions;

(e) The information received by the Committee will be kept confidential if the provider so requests or if the Committee so decides;

(f) With a view to assisting Governments in their endeavour to implement the measures referred to in paragraph 4 above, the Committee may decide to supply to the Governments concerned information forwarded to it relating to alleged violations and ask any such Governments to report to the Committee subsequently on any investigations undertaken.

8. Decision-making

(a) The Committee will reach decisions by consensus of its members. If consensus cannot be reached on a particular issue, the Chairman should undertake such further consultations as may facilitate agreement. If after these consultations, consensus still cannot be reached, the matter may be submitted to the Security Council. Given the specific nature of the information, the Chairman may encourage bilateral exchanges between interested Member States in order to clarify the issue prior to a decision;

(b) Where the Committee agrees, decisions may be taken by a written procedure. In such cases the Chairman will circulate to all members of the Committee the proposed decision of the Committee, and will request members of the Committee to indicate any objection they may have to the proposed decision within 2 working days (or in urgent situations, such shorter period as the Chairman shall determine). If no objection is received within such a period, the decision will be deemed adopted.

9. Reports to the Security Council and information to Member States

(a) The Committee will submit regular reports, including recommendations as necessary, to the Security Council in relation to the implementation of resolution 1390 (2002), either orally or in writing, as requested by the Security Council, or where the Committee deems it necessary to submit a report to the Security Council;

(b) In order to enhance and publicize the work of the Committee, the Chairman will brief interested Member States and the press following formal meetings of the Committee, unless the Committee decides otherwise. In addition, the Chairman will be authorized, after prior consultations with and upon approval of the Committee, to hold press conferences or issue press releases on any aspect of the Committee's work.

Annex IV

Documents available on the Internet

THE WOLFSBERG ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING PRINCIPLES FOR CORRESPONDENT BANKING
The Wolfsberg Group of Banks
5 November 2002
http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/correspondent_banking_principles.pdf

GUIDANCE NOTES FOR THE SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON TERRORIST FINANCING AND THE SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering
27 March 2002
http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/TF-SAGUIDE20020327_en.pdf

GUIDANCE FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN DETECTING TERRORIST FINANCING
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering
24 April 2002
http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/GuidFITF01_en.pdf

COMBATING THE ABUSE OF NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering
11 October 2002
http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/SR8-NPO_en.pdf

PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERPRETATIVE NOTE TO FATF SPECIAL RECOMMENDATION VII: WIRE TRANSFERS
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering
11 October 2002
http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/INSR7-Consult_en.pdf

United Nations S/2002/1339

Security Council

Distr.: General
10 December 2002

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Note by the President of the Security Council

Attached is the final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA (see annex), which is being submitted in accordance with paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1439 (2002) of 18 October 2002.

02-72496 (E) 111202

Annex

Letter dated 4 December 2002 from the Chairman of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola

On behalf of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA, I have the honour to enclose the Mechanism's report in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 1439 (2002) of 18 October 2002. I should be grateful if it could be brought to the attention of the Committee members.

(*Signed*) Juan **Larrain**
Chairman
Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA

I. Introduction

1. The present report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA is being submitted in accordance with paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1439 (2002) of 18 October 2002. By that resolution, the Council extended the Mechanism's mandate for a two-month period and requested it to carry out ample consultations in Angola with representatives of the Government and UNITA with a view to contributing to a full review by the Council of the sanctions imposed on UNITA. In addition, the Council requested the Mechanism to provide information on possible violations of sanctions that might have occurred since the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding of 4 April 2002; and to consider issues related to UNITA funds and financial resources that have been frozen by Member States. This report is the seventh in a series since the Mechanism's appointment in July 2000. The current members of the Mechanism are Ambassador Juan Larrain (Chile), Chairman, and Mr. Ismaila Seck (Senegal).

2. In its last report (S/2002/1119), the Mechanism recognized the extremely significant developments that have occurred in Angola since the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on 4 April 2002, including the absence of any ceasefire violations and the transformation of UNITA into a fully fledged political party. At the current juncture, the Mechanism wishes to applaud the historic process that has led to the completion of the outstanding tasks of the Lusaka Protocol and to the signing of the declaration by the Joint Commission on the Peace Process on 20 November 2002 by representatives of the Government, UNITA and the Troika of Observer States and by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (see S/2002/1274). By that declaration, the signatories verify that the main tasks of the Angolan peace process have been completed and recommend that the Security Council consider the immediate lifting of all sanctions. The unfolding of these events and the determined commitment of the Angolan people to consolidating a climate of peace and reconciliation in the country constitute vital steps in the new history of the country.

3. In carrying out its mandate in accordance with resolution 1439 (2002), the Mechanism visited Angola from 4 to 9 November 2002. It held extensive consultations with representatives of the Government, including the Vice-Minister for External Relations, the Chief of Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces, the head of military intelligence and officials of the External Intelligence Directorate. In addition, the Mechanism met with the leadership of UNITA, namely, its Secretary-General, Paulo Lukamba Gato, and Messrs. Dachala, Sakala, Samakuva and Da Costa Jr. UNITA stressed that, during the past eight months, it had clearly demonstrated that it had abandoned the use of armed force, and that consequently it was imperative to lift sanctions so as to permit the movement to operate fully as a legitimate political party. The meetings held with the two parties were exhaustive, detailed and conducted in a positive spirit, with a view to assessing and clarifying any remaining areas of concern with regard to sanctions. The Mechanism also benefited from discussions with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and from the valuable input of members of the Troika, the European Union and other representatives of the international community based in Luanda.

4. On the basis of the positive developments relating to the peace process, and having found no evidence of sanctions violations, on 12 November 2002, the Mechanism requested the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established

pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) to urgently convene a meeting. The Chairman of the Monitoring Mechanism informed the Committee on 20 November that the objectives of Security Council resolutions 864 (1993), 1127 (1997) and 1173 (1998) had been met. Given that UNITA was fulfilling its obligations within the context of the peace process, the Mechanism further recommended that the Council should consider lifting all sanctions on UNITA as a matter of priority, and at the earliest opportunity.

II. Findings

Resolution 864 (1993): arms and petroleum

5. Since the signing of the ceasefire agreement, no violations have been reported. The magnitude of this fact alone, especially for a country that has been gripped by conflict for more than 30 years, is very important. In response to a direct question, officials of the Ministry of Defence stated that UNITA was disarmed and that it no longer posed a military threat to the peace process. The Mechanism was provided with recently updated information indicating that UNITA had surrendered approximately 95 per cent of its weapons. The officials stated that the search for the remaining weapons was being conducted, as an ongoing process, in a spirit of cooperation with UNITA. In addition to the arms surrendered by former UNITA combatants in the quartering areas, 56 caches of arms and ammunitions scattered throughout the country have been uncovered. The weapons are detailed below:

Arms found in 56 caches (4 April-22 October 2002)

Arms	*Quantity*
AKM	1 259
G-3	89
Mauser	2
Carbine	2
RPK	2
RPD	35
Browning-P-30	4
PKM	38
DP-46	20
HK-21	2
RPG-7	107
M-79	15
AGS-17	20
GP-25	3
Mortar, 60 mm	83
Mortar, 81 mm	20
Mortar, 82 mm	92
Mortar, 120 mm	1

Arms	*Quantity*
ZPU-2 14.5 mm	29
ZGU-1 14.5 mm	1
DSHK 12.7 mm	11
ZU-23-2-23 mm	21
Ramp Missiles anti-tank	2
Ramp L. Fagot SAM 7	1
Ramp L. Fagot Concours	12
Ramp L.B-12/107 mm	5
Cannon SPG-9	2
Cannon B-10/82 mm	8
Cannon 75 mm	2
Cannon 106 mm	10

Ammunition found in 56 caches (4 April-22 October 2002)

Ammunition	*Quantity*
M-43 PS	2 567
M-08 LPS	1 477 056
M-41 G-3	1 848 814
5.45 mm	55 450
5.56 mm	1 080
12.7 mmx76 P/CORRC	93 351
14.5 mm	109 163
23 mm	38 516
20 mm Zu-20	4 980
Gran OG7/PG-7	550
Gran OG9/PG-9	457
Gran Voog 17	1 753
Gran Voog 25	95
Gran M-79	37
Mortar 60 mm	1 210
Mortar 81 mm	835
Mortar 82 mm	981
Mortar 120 mm	461
Projectile B-10/82 mm	900
Projectile 75 mm	244
Projectile 76 mm	812
Projectile 106 mm	3 818
Projectile D-30/122 mm	114
Projectile M-46/130 mm	9

Ammunition	*Quantity*
Projectile 107 mm/B-12	410
Projectile M-21/122 mm	57
Projectile BMP-2/30 mm	128
Projectile 100 mm, Tang	600
12.7 mmx 99-P 50	3 090
12.7 mmx 108-anti-aircraft	5 602
Missiles, anti-aircraft, SAM-14	1
Missiles, anti-tank Fagot	31
Missiles, anti-tank Concours	7
Missiles, anti-tank RPG-22	31
Missiles, anti-tank Low	3
Missiles, anti-tank armbrust	21
Gran M Defensive	1 439
Gran M Chemise	45
Deflagration anti-tank and anti-personnel	10 344

6. Government officials consulted in Luanda agreed that the presence of small arms in the country constituted a problem. They indicated, however, that the use of such weapons for organized military purposes was unlikely. During its meetings, the Mechanism sought to obtain additional details with regard to the transport, arms and diamond networks that had fuelled and profited from the conflict, but no information was provided. With reference to petroleum, the Government indicated that, as UNITA is no longer an armed movement, its historical reliance on petroleum and therefore the need to maintain this sanction is equally irrelevant.

Resolution 1127 (1997): representation

7. The Mechanism's last report (S/2002/1119) was prepared on the basis of information available in August 2002. Since that time, UNITA has completed its transformation into a political party. Questions the Mechanism had raised concerning the status of important UNITA figures involved in diamond and arms smuggling, as well as senior military officials who had not been incorporated into the Angolan Armed Forces, were addressed to representatives of the Government and to UNITA. At separate meetings, the two parties agreed that the individuals in question had either returned to civilian status in Angola or had chosen to remain as private residents in countries abroad. Meeting with the Mechanism, the Vice-Minister for External Relations explained that the Angolan constitution and laws governed the activities of political parties both domestically and internationally. Representatives of UNITA are now being incorporated into various government positions, including as ambassadors for Angola abroad.

Resolution 1173 (1998): diamonds and finance

Diamonds

8. The Government informed the Mechanism that, although smuggling of diamonds continued to be a problem, Ascorp (the Angola Selling Corporation) had begun to introduce measures to tighten internal controls. It believed that these new rules, coupled with the new procedures that will be introduced when the Kimberly Process is implemented, should serve to considerably curtail smuggling. The Government further indicated that such illicit activities and trade were now regarded as criminal matters. In any case, the Mechanism received assurances that UNITA as an organization was no longer involved in trading diamonds for weapons.

Finance

9. The Mechanism continued its efforts to obtain data on UNITA funds and financial resources currently frozen pursuant to existing measures. Given the limited time available for reporting these details to the Security Council, the Mechanism addressed correspondence to a number of Member States in which senior UNITA officials were known to be residing or operating. It drew the attention of those Governments to resolution 1439 (2002), in which the Council called upon all States to cooperate fully with the Mechanism in the discharge of its mandate, and requested information concerning the numbers of frozen accounts, investments or other assets; the dates on which the accounts were frozen; the names of the institutions holding the accounts; and the amounts frozen. Where available, the Mechanism also provided those Governments with relevant documentation such as copies of transfers of funds between senior UNITA officials.

10. The Mechanism in its earlier reports (S/2002/486 and S/2002/1119) has outlined in detail the specific measures taken by some countries in compliance with the financial sanctions regime imposed against UNITA and its senior officials.

11. According to available information, the countries in which frozen accounts of senior UNITA officials have been identified are Belgium, Côte d'Ivoire, France, Ireland, Portugal, Switzerland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It should be noted that a large number of countries have also taken various measures, including specific regulations, and have issued directives and instructions, designed to implement financial sanctions. At the same time, there were reports of a number of factors which have hindered the effectiveness of the implementation of financial sanctions, in particular with regard to their scope and depth.

12. These factors are in substance related, on the one hand, to the absence of a standard definition of the funds and the financial resources or assets which should be subjected to freezing and, on the other hand, to the lack of operating guidelines. Consequently, a large number of countries have restricted the scope of the implementation of sanctions to merely identifying and freezing accounts at a given time. With the exception of Switzerland, there has been very limited success in expanding the scope of measures to investigate the movement of funds in and out of the accounts prior to their being frozen. Similarly, in most cases, other forms of assets, such as equity, income-producing properties etc., were not affected by the measures taken by the countries.

13. These facts, associated with domestic legislation regarding confidentiality and the lack of transparency in the operations of offshore centres, have significantly impeded the effective implementation of financial sanctions.

14. Examination of the financial data made available to the Mechanism showed that, in the large majority of instances, specific details regarding the business activity or other sources that generated cash flow in the accounts were missing.

15. In a single instance (data from Switzerland) that did reflect the details referred to above, the accounts proved to be negative, as the holder was unemployed, and the business accounts of the firms associated with that holder turned out to be inactive, for lack of business activity.

16. The data forwarded by Portugal reflected the freezing of 19 accounts (individual and/or business accounts). Neither the balance in each account nor the source of cash was indicated, however.

17. During the Mechanism's meetings in Luanda, UNITA emphatically stressed the importance of lifting financial sanctions. The leadership indicated that it would not be able to operate as a political party if it continued to be denied the freedom to open bank accounts. This would impede its legitimization and undermine its ability to fully participate in the political process in the country. The Vice-Minister for External Relations expressed the view that, as long as UNITA operated within the confines of national law, which forbids political parties but not individuals from having accounts abroad, the Government had no objection to the unfreezing of accounts. With regard to the disposition of funds, should the Security Council decide to lift sanctions, countries may use differing approaches in handling claims to frozen funds and financial resources, in conformity with national banking laws and legislation.

III. Concluding remarks

18. At this time, as we close the chapter on sanctions against UNITA, now converted into a united political party and beginning to participate in the life of the country, Angola can look forward to a better future of peace and development. The coming general elections will seal a process initiated by the signing of the ceasefire, the Memorandum of Understanding and the end of the work of the Joint Commission.

19. In this context, sanctions should be lifted as a matter of priority, in accordance with the new reality in Angola.

20. For the Security Council, this has been a very important and successful endeavour, and an example of sustained efforts that really served the cause of peace. Now it is up to the people of Angola to consolidate what has been achieved and devote all the energies and resources of the country to meet the urgent chailenges that lie ahead, especially in the humanitarian field. In this respect, the continuing support of the international community will be indispensable.

21. At the end of its work, the Mechanism would like to pay a special tribute to the Governments of the countries concerned for the cooperation extended and their commitment to peace. Their understanding was crucial to making the sanctions work. The response obtained from the international, regional and subregional organizations was extremely important, moreover, and their active engagement was

a key factor for the effective implementation of the sanctions. Within the limits of their capacities, they did their utmost, and the Mechanism is very grateful for their valuable cooperation.

United Nations S/2002/1340

Security Council

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Letter dated 2 December 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the pleasure to present to you herewith the fourth report on the work of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF), covering the period from 1 to 31 October 2002 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ümit **Pamir**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

02-72974 (E) 101202

Annex to the letter dated 2 December 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Monthly report on the operations of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan for the period from 1 to 31 October 2002

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

Security in Kabul and its surrounding areas continued to strengthen in the reporting period, leading to the lifting of the night curfew for the first time in 23 years. ISAF maintains a discreet and substantial presence in the city and enjoys the full confidence and cooperation of the Afghan authorities. The local community strongly welcomes ISAF's presence and its contribution to the establishment of a safe and peaceful environment. Despite these positive trends, there is some concern about the plight of refugees, who have returned to Kabul in recent times, and vulnerable families, especially in view of the approaching winter conditions. Furthermore, most police and army personnel have not been paid for many months, fuelling suspicions of their involvement in ordinary crime. However, it is encouraging to note that the Afghan authorities have been able to reach conceptual agreement on the establishment of a national army. The central government has also made some progress on extending its authority to the provinces. The international community should help consolidate the current stability by providing Afghanistan with the requisite support through the central government.

1. INTRODUCTION:

Security in Kabul and its surrounding areas continued to strengthen in October. The situation was calm and peaceful, almost without any notable incident. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has continued to discharge its responsibilities as planned and sustained its enhanced security measures, albeit in a more discreet manner. Security coordination and intelligence-sharing both among the relevant Afghan authorities themselves and between the security entities and ISAF have noticeably improved. The better security conditions have made it possible to lift, as of 3 November, the night curfew for the first time in 23 years. This is for a trial period during the Ramadan and will be extended if the positive trends continue. The lifting of the curfew has substantially boosted morale of Kabul citizens and their confidence in the ability of the security entities. ISAF has nevertheless increased its night patrols, especially during those hours when the curfew had previously been applied. The ISAF Commander, Major General Hilmi Akin ZOREL, has continued to take up the issue of the equipment requirements of the local police and the other law-enforcement agencies in Kabul with both the senior Afghan leadership and the

international community. The Afghan government has been expending great effort toward forging a broad national consensus on the fundamental issues facing Afghanistan, including the establishment of a national army and the extension of the central government's authority to the regions. It is essential that the international community provides the central government with substantial political, financial and technical support, so as to prevent Afghanistan from succumbing once again to conflict and extremism.

2. ISAF ACTIVITIES:

a. General;

(1) Lithuania has joined ISAF as of 16 October, when for medical personnel took up posts in the ISAF field hospital. As of 31 October, ISAF is composed of 4823 personnel from 22 countries.

(2) Enhanced ISAF operations continued as planned in October, albeit in a more discreet manner. ISAF's visibility and presence in the city has been maintained. An average of 45 security patrols a day were conducted on a 24-hour basis, mostly on foot. Approximately, two-thirds of these patrols were conducted jointly with the Afghan police. Many random check-points were established. ISAF also provided additional security, including checks for explosive ordnance, prior to and during international conferences, fairs and visits by senior statesmen.

(3) ISAF found and confiscated a significant amount of weapons and ammunition in October, including rockets, unexploded ordnance and air defence systems, indicating that terrorist elements are experiencing increasing difficulties in their movements and planning. As of 24 October, ISAF explosive ordnance disposal teams destroyed 107.000 rounds of explosives, including anti-tank weapons, unguided missiles, mines and anti-aircraft weapons.

(4) ISAF has continued to implement enhanced security measures in the city and raised its presence and visibility especially in the Bagrami district, where a number of incidents had occurred in the past. A joint command centre has been established and operationalized in the Bagrami district, through the cooperation of ISAF and the Afghan 5th Division. In sharp contrast to previous times, no serious incidents have since occurred in Bagrami. An ISAF task force has been deployed on Shina Hill overlooking the city. ISAF personnel have continued to liaise regularly

with the observation posts set up bay the Kabul Garrison on the edge of our area of responsibility.

(5) ISAF continues to enjoy the full confidence of the senior Afghan leadership. The ISAF commanders work closely with the senior Afghan leaders, on the basis of the full congruity between the objectives of ISAF and of the Afghan authorities. The ISAF leadership also mairttains close contact with the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General.

(6) The Joint Coordinating Body (JCB), set up in accordance with the Military Technical Agreement, met twice during the reporting period. The first meeting took place on 10 October 2002 at the Ministry of the Interior. The meeting was conducted in the usual cooperative atmosphere, on the basis of an agenda prepared by ISAF. Ambassador Brahimi, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, requested ISAF to prepare a summary record of each meeting. ISAF has assumed this responsibility; the summary record of each JCB meeting is prepared by ISAF and coordinated with the office of the Special Representative before being distributed to the other participants. The meeting deliberated on the general security situation in Kabul, wherein the participants agreed that security was improving. The second meeting of the JCB was held on 24 October 2002, at the Kabul Garrison. UNAMA provided a presentation on the winterization programme for returnees and vulnerable families. The participants noted that the preparations by the Operational Winter Task Force to help returnees and vulnerable families cope with the approaching winter conditions were underway, that stocks of food and shelter material mostly complete and that no major disasters are expected unless the winter would be severe. The meeting also heard a report on the activities of the Kabul Garrison to provide for security and law and order in Kabul, with ISAF's help.

(7) In an effort to ensure adequate Ministerial protection, ISAF has so far provided close protection training for a total of 667 Afghan bodyguards. An additional group of 100 bodyguards from the Ministry of the Interior will shortly begin training. Furthermore, ISAF experts have visited 20 Ministerial buildings in order to assess their security arrangements. ISAF has conveyed its recommendations for security enhancements to the Afghan authorities in writing.

(8) Turkish instructors continue to provide the 1st Battalion Afghan National Guard with advanced training. The training programme began in September and is expected to conclude at the end of November. The

ISAF Commander inspected the training activities on 3 October, together with Lieutenant-General Bismillah Khan, Commander of the Kabul Garrison.

(9) ISAF continues to address the equipment requirements of the Ministry of the Interior, the Kabul police and the security personnel serving at the entry-exit points in the city. Most local police stations visited by ISAF personnel have been found to be critically under-equipped. The ISAF leadership has brought the matter to the attention of the Afghan authorities and called for the acquisition of weapons, wireless sets and cars for the police force, as well as detectors to help with the search for explosives. Turkey is seeking to provide the Ministry of the Interior with weapons and ammunition, while the United Kingdom is planning to donate 100.000 US Dollars to provide special equipment for use at the entry-exit points.

(10) ISAF has endeavoured to enhance coordination and intelligence-sharing among the relevant Afghan security entities, especially the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior, the National Directorate for Security, the local police and the Kabul Garrison. The Committee for Intelligence Coordination, which was established with this aim in mind, has been holding weekly meetings.

(11) ISAF continues to enjoy the full trust and respect of the people of Kabul, who appreciate the nature of ISAF's responsibilities and its contribution to security and stability. The ISAF commanders have issued strict orders to all ISAF personnel to treat the local citizens with courtesy at all times and to respect local customs and values, especially during the month of Ramadan. The ISAF leadership remains equi-distant to all the ethnic groups that make up the people of Afghanistan.

(12) ISAF sustains a broad information campaign relating to ISAF activities, government work and the presence of the international community in Kabul, by making use of public announcements, radio and television advertisements, posters and the ISAF newspaper.

b. Security in Kabul and its surrounding areas:

(1) Kabul was calm and peaceful in October. Crime rates remained low. A sense of normality has returned to the city, with an active commercial life. Tired of violence and factional politics, ordinary citizens are seeking to improve their standards of living. The lifting of the night

curfew, for the first time in 23 years, has greatly boosted optimism in the local community.

(2) ISAF explosive ordnance experts carried out a controlled explosion on the night of 23 October, in order to destroy a suspiciously located bag believed to contain an improvised explosive device. ISAF experts deal with explosive material on location, due to the potential risk to ordnance experts of removing them.

(3) Nevertheless, despite the calm atmosphere in the city, a potential terrorist threat remains, as corroborated by the large amounts of weapons and ammunition found and confiscated by ISAF. Vigilance will therefore be maintained, including vigourous patrolling, in order to prevent a return to conflict and caos.

c. Assistance projects towards the local community:

ISAF continued to run an extensive CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) programme in October so as to provide assistance to the local community. This assistance was channeled through carefully selected quick-impact projects on the basis of local requirements and humanitarian considerations, respect for cultural and religious values and the principle of equi-distance to all the ethnic groups making up the people of Afghanistan. Assistance efforts focus on the field of education and public health and include the renovation of educational and health establishments (schools, kindergartens, orphanages, hospitals and clinics), supply of teaching materials, provision of equipment and engineering expertise to help with the water supply and sanitation, provision of fire-fighting training and equipment, air traffic control and meteorological training, assistance with the water, electricity, library and reproduction facilities of the two universities in Kabul and supply of medical aid and distribution of baby food. The renovation and refurbishment the Yakatoot High School and the restoration of the historical "Shahe du Shamshera" mosque, which re-opened for prayers on 31 October, are particular examples of ISAF's CIMIC work.

As the local community continues to convey numerous requests for assistance, ISAF endeavours to utilize its own limited resources to the full and seeks financial support from other sources. To date, 154 projects have been completed by ISAF, 45 current projects are underway and a further another 78 projects are being staffed and planned. Most of these projects are funded from the national sources of the ISAF countries while the EU provides funding for the efforts to improve the water supply, and reconstruction of schools and kindergartens in Kabul. Contributions by UN member countries to the trust fund established

pursuant to the UN Security Council resolution 1386 would help finance ISAF's joint expenses including CIMIC project.

3. SPECIFIC CHALLENGES:

The following specific issues, falling outside of ISAF's core mission, continue to have implications for security and stability in Kabul.

a. The Afghan authorities have reached conceptual agreement on the direction of defense reform and the establishment and training of an Afghan National Army. The Afghan authorities have prepared a detailed conceptual document setting out parameters for defense reform and a final government decree is expected to be issued shortly. The international community should do all it can to support the implementation of this conceptual agreement, including the difficult process of demobilizing former combatants and of integrating parts of the personal armed forces of the regional leaders into a coherent and efficient army.

b. International aid is still limited, in contrast to the repeated appeals by the Afghan authorities and the pledges made at the Tokyo Conference. The lack of adequate financial assistance continues to hamper the commendable efforts of the Afghan government, which has dispatched official delegations to various provinces and removed several public and military officials from their posts for misuse of power or improper conduct. Mobile police teams were deployed on main inter-city routes in order to ensure law and order. The government has also managed to persuade several provincial leaders to hand custom revenues over to the central government. Therefore, there is a reasonable cause for optimism, which should be recognized and encouraged by the international community, especially with respect to payments of salaries for police and army personnel.

c. There is some concern for the plight of approximately 600.000 refugees who have returned to Kabul and vulnerable families, particularly in view of the approaching winter conditions. In all, more than 1.8 million people are estimated to have returned to the country since March. A failure to provide adequate assistance for those individuals and families might have a nefative impact upon the security circumstances in Kabul. ISAF is consulting the UNHCR officials for the provision of security for the winterization program designed to assist people through the winter months.

4. CONCLUSION:

ISAF continued to provide substantial assistance, in the reporting period, to the Afghan authorities in maintaining security and stability in Kabul and its surrounding areas. The situation in the city continues to be calm and peaceful, as corroborated by the lifting of the night curfew in he city for the first time in 23 years. In addition to its direct contribution to the security, ISAF has also been assisting the Afghan authorities to remedy certain shortfalls in the security system. However, substantial international assistance should be mobilized without further delay in order to consolidate the current stability.

The Turkish term as the ISAF lead nation is scheduled to end on 20 December 2002, therefore, Turkey wishes to ensure timely and smooth transfer of command.

United Nations S/2002/1341

Security Council

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10 December 2002

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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1437 (2002) of 11 October 2002 by which the Council authorized a last extension of the mandate of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) until 15 December 2002 and requested me to report on the completion of the mandate. This final report provides an update of developments since my report of 2 October 2002 (S/2002/1101) and a brief overview of United Nations involvement in Prevlaka since 1992.

II. Progress towards a negotiated settlement

2. Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have continued bilateral negotiations with a view to concluding an interim agreement providing for the normalization of the situation in Prevlaka. During my recent visit to the region, I urged the parties to conclude their negotiations by the end of November to allow for an orderly handover by the time the mandate of UNMOP expires on 15 December. Both sides have appointed focal points who are to coordinate with the Chief Military Observer and who have separately made preliminary visits to the peninsula recently. On 10 December, the sides signed the Protocol between the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Government of the Republic of Croatia on the Interim Regime along the Southern Border between the Two States.

III. Situation in the area of responsibility of the Mission

3. The demilitarized zone was respected by both parties and the situation there and in the United Nations-controlled zone remained calm and stable. The long-standing violations of the security regime in the United Nations-controlled zone continued, but did not give rise to security concerns. They involved the presence and patrolling of Croatian and Montenegrin police and the continued operation by Croatia and Montenegro of checkpoints established in the zone in 1999 for the purpose of implementing a crossing regime. The Croatian and Montenegrin authorities continued to permit civilians to enter the zone for tourism, recreation and

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subsistence purposes. As in the past, small fishing or pleasure craft entered the waters of the zone from both sides.

4. In view of the prevailing peaceful conditions in the area and the scheduled withdrawal of UNMOP, the Mission closed the team sites at Gruda and Herceg Novi in November. It continued to maintain its 24-hour presence at the team site on the Ostra peninsula and at the headquarters at Cavtat (see attached map). Cooperation between UNMOP and the multinational Stabilization Force (SFOR) was maintained through periodic meetings.

IV. The United Nations on Prevlaka

5. During the decade of United Nations engagement on the Prevlaka peninsula, the dispute was mostly overshadowed by the larger conflicts in the region. The military observers of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), assigned to the Prevlaka peninsula on 20 October 1992 under the authorization of Security Council resolution 779 (1992), carried out their mandate against the backdrop of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995). Efforts during that time to draw the parties into negotiations were not successful.

6. During the period 1996-1998, the parties focused mainly on the situation in Eastern Slavonia (Croatia) and despite the provision for a negotiated settlement of the Prevlaka dispute in the Agreement on Normalization of Relations signed by Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 23 August 1996 (S/1996/744), no progress was made. It was during this period, in 1996, that UNMOP was established as an independent mission.

7. It was only after the conclusion of the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium that the parties were able to begin a round of direct negotiations on Prevlaka in 1998. This initial dialogue, comprising four meetings alternately in Zagreb and Belgrade, was suspended with the commencement of military action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in March 1999 by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

8. In October 1999, at the request of the Security Council (resolution 1252 (1999)), I presented a package of confidence-building measures to the parties. Although the measures were considered workable by the United Nations, neither of the parties were willing to accept the package in its entirety.

9. The absence of major conflict in the region and the change in government in both Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 2000 created more favourable conditions for progress on the Prevlaka issue. A process of consultation between the two sides led to the formation in December 2001 of a joint Interstate Diplomatic Commission tasked with resolving the outstanding border disputes between the two States. During 2002, the Commission and its constituent subcommissions met continually in an effort to develop a common agenda for resolving the Prevlaka dispute. By April 2002, both sides had reached the stage where they were able to report in a joint letter to the President of the Security Council that they were negotiating, in good faith and in an atmosphere of mutual confidence and respect, a comprehensive cross-border regime which "would eventually contribute to the successful ending of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka" (S/2002/368).

V. Observations

10. I welcome the Protocol signed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia on 10 December. It is obvious that the parties have advanced sufficiently in their bilateral relations so that an international monitoring mechanism is no longer required. The situation is quiet, demilitarization is not in question and it is generally understood that there is no risk of renewed hostilities. Given the presence of mines, unexploded ordnance and ammunition in the area of handover, which requires careful handling, it is my intention to keep a small core staff for a few days beyond 15 December, but not to stay beyond 31 December 2002, to ensure that the handover is conducted in a safe and orderly fashion.

11. The responsibility for settling this dispute rests with Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I trust that they will build on the achievements of the United Nations in the interest of both countries. The gradual restoration of normal life between these two formerly warring parties provides hope that stability and peaceful coexistence can and should be their common future.

12. Throughout a turbulent decade in the Balkans, UNMOP contributed to insulating Prevlaka from the surrounding conflicts and tensions and ensured that hostilities nearby did not create instability on the peninsula. It demonstrated that even a small United Nations presence, properly conceived and executed, can make a difference.

13. In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to the Chief Military Observer of UNMOP, Colonel Mujica, to his predecessors and to the military and civilian staff who have served the United Nations on Prevlaka since 1992. I thank them all for their contribution to the cause of peace.

Map 4137 Rev. 6 United Nations
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United Nations S/2002/1342

Security Council

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Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 7 December 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I wish to transmit to you herewith the daily report on the activities carried out by the inspection teams of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iraq on 7 December 2002.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Aldouri**
Permanent Representative

02-73157 (E) 101202 101202

Annex to the identical letters dated 7 December 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

Daily report on the activities of the UNMOVIC and IAEA inspection teams in Iraq

Report on the activities carried out on 7 December 2002, the third day of the blessed Id al-Fitr

On 7 December 2002, corresponding to the third day of the blessed Id al-Fitr, the UNMOVIC and IAEA inspection teams resumed their activities, which they had suspended on 5 and 6 December 2002, as follows:

1. The UNMOVIC inspection team set out from its headquarters at the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 8.25 a.m. The team, which included 15 inspectors and was headed by Mr. William Jolley, arrived at the Al-Quds General Company, a research company established in September 2002 which belongs to the Military Industrialization Commission and specializes in mechanical design activities. The team entered the site at 9.17 a.m., whereupon it did the following:

(a) Met with the general manager of the company, asked questions about the company's activities and organizational structure and requested a copy of the overall plan of the company, receiving answers to its questions and being provided with what it requested;

(b) Following the meeting, the team split into two groups, which inspected all the site buildings and laboratories, addressing questions to the general manager and the site specialists on the systems, equipment and laboratories located in the company. The company specialists answered the questions;

The inspection team completed its task at 12.45 p.m. and returned to its headquarters at the Canal Hotel at 1.35 p.m.

2. The IAEA inspection team set out from its headquarters at the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 8.30 a.m. The team, which included four inspectors and was headed by Mr. Alexander Panasyuk, arrived at 8.52 a.m. at the site of the Shakyli storage facilities belonging to the Atomic Energy Commission and located at Tuwaitha. The storage facilities include equipment, systems and primary materials subject to ongoing monitoring and sealed with IAEA seals. The team entered the site at 8.52 a.m., whereupon it did the following:

(a) Visited the five storage facilities located at the site, checked all the equipment located in the facilities and compared it with the inventories in its possession;

(b) Verified all the seals on the equipment and replaced one of the seals on the frequency converter with a new seal;

(c) Performed a radiation survey by means of portable equipment inside the storage facilities and on the public ways in the storage site with a view to detecting any nuclear activity or undeclared nuclear materials or radiation sources;

(d) Photographed some of the equipment in the storage facilities.

The inspection team completed its task at 11.55 a.m. and arrived at its headquarters at the Canal Hotel at 12 noon.

3. The declarations required pursuant to paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 1441 (2002) were delivered on the evening of 7 December 2002 at the Baghdad Monitoring Centre in the Canal Hotel. The nuclear, chemical, biological and missile declarations included a total of 11,900 pages of details on Iraq's previous programmes and supporting documents. Also delivered were four compact disks representing the half-yearly declarations. These were new copies of the declarations delivered in Vienna on 1 October 2002. The declarations totalled 12,000 pages.

United Nations S/2002/1343

Security Council

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Identical letters dated 9 December 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the daily report on the activities of the inspection teams of the Untied Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iraq on 8 December 2002 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Aldouri**
Permanent Representative

02-73323 (E) 121202 121202

Annex to the identical letters dated 9 December 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

Daily report on the activities of the UNMOVIC and IAEA inspection teams in Iraq

Report on the activities carried out on 8 December 2002

The activities of the UNMOVIC and IAEA inspection teams on Sunday, 8 December 2002, were as follows:

1. The UNMOVIC inspection team set out from its headquarters at the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 8:38 a.m. The team, comprised of 15 inspectors and headed by Mr. William Jolley, arrived at 9.50 a.m. at the site of the Al-Tareq Public Company, a pesticide plant, located in the Fallujah area 70 kilometres west of Baghdad. The factory specializes in the manufacture of agricultural and household pesticides. On arriving at the site, the team split up into three groups, which carried out the following activities:

(a) The first group met with the Director of the plant and asked a number of questions with regard to the castor oil production unit. This unit was destroyed during the attack of 16 to 20 December 1998 by the United States of America and Great Britain, which, in the same attack, destroyed the control system of the former Special Commission's monitoring chambers. Production was halted and the remaining parts were dismantled, except for the production system, and moved out to be used for other purposes. A castor oil extraction unit was set up in the factory, near the unit which had been destroyed, and began operating in 1999. The first group also took a tour of the plant's administrative offices, inspected the files and visited the maintenance, solid pesticide and herbicide departments, the telephone switchboard area and the political party offices in the factory;

(b) The second group of the inspection team inspected the labels on the equipment and photographed them;

(c) The third group of the inspection team inspected the site facilities, measured the concentration of the chemical compounds using hand-held devices and inspected the labels on the remaining equipment of the dismantled castor oil production unit;

(d) The factory authorities provided the inspection team with a summary of the condition of the destroyed portion and of the portion of the factory monitoring system that was still usable, as well as the state of the air sampling system in the company warehouses.

The inspection team finished its work at 2.45 p.m. and returned to its headquarters at the Canal Hotel at 4.05 p.m.

2. The IAEA inspection team set out from its headquarters at the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 8.30 a.m. The team, comprised of three inspectors and headed by Mr. Alexander Panasyuk, arrived at 8.55 a.m. at the Geological Services Public Company under the Ministry of Industries and Minerals, located in downtown

Baghdad. This company specializes in taking geological surveys of Iraqi land to locate its mineral resources. On arriving at the site, the team did the following:

(a) Met with a member of the company liaison team at the National Monitoring Directorate, who explained the company's operations and departments to them and took the team on a guided tour of the premises, including all the company departments and offices;

(b) Inspected the pilot purification unit at the Abu Sujair mine, which has been abandoned since 1991 but was included in the biannual declarations. The team photographed the deposits of the pilot system and some company laboratories;

(c) Took a radiation survey of the site and the abandoned equipment using mobile devices in order to check for any nuclear activity, nuclear material or source of radiation which had not been declared;

(d) Inspected the company's mobile geological analysis laboratory and verified the IAEA labels on its equipment.

The inspection team finished its work at 10.30 a.m. and returned to its headquarters at the Canal Hotel at 10.40 a.m.

3. The Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission received two empty bottles from the IAEA inspection team, which it is to fill with liquid nitrogen from its stocks so that the Agency will have what it needs to operate the radiation analysis equipment.

4. On 8 December 2002, a nuclear inspection team comprised of 25 inspectors arrived at Saddam International Airport.

5. Remarks: The pesticide plant which the inspection team visited today is one of the sites listed in the report of United Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair as manufacturing weapons of mass destruction.

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General Assembly
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General Assembly
Fifty-seventh session
Agenda item 22 (l)
Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and other organizations: cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Security Council
Fifty-seventh year

Letter dated 9 December 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement by His Excellency Mr. Vilayat Guliyev, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, at the 10th meeting of the Ministerial Council of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, held at Porto, Portugal, on 7 December 2002.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex urgently circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 22 (l) "Cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe" and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yashar T. **Aliyev**
Permanent Representative

02-72934 (E) 111202

Annex to the letter dated 9 December 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan at the 10th meeting of the Ministerial Council of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, held at Porto, Portugal, on 7 December 2002

My country has subscribed to the statement made yesterday by the distinguished Minister of Ukraine on behalf of the GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) group. Speaking in my national capacity, I join the previous speakers in extending appreciation to the outgoing Chairman-in-Office, Minister Martins da Cruz, and welcoming our new Chairman, Minister Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, and wish him every success in implementation of numerous tasks our organization is facing.

At the very outset, I would like to reconfirm our conviction that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has further to play its role in building a new Euro-Atlantic security architecture as the only all-inclusive pan-European institution. We have no reasons to be complacent or over-optimistic when it comes to practical realization of the potential of OSCE and its real effectiveness in coping with the complex challenges being encountered in the area of European security.

Regrettably, 2002 has become another wasted year in terms of rectifying serious deficiencies in the substance and methods of work at OSCE. The organization has not been successful and consistent in achieving implementation of its norms and principles. The most fundamental principles that European security builds upon, such as sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders, have yet to be safeguarded throughout the whole OSCE region. This is crucially important, especially with regard to the settlement of the decade-long conflicts within its area. Lack of consistency in upholding OSCE values has nothing in common with the so-called flexibility of OSCE. How many more years are we going to tolerate this situation?

A selective approach in addressing similar problems in a number of regions continues to dominate OSCE. While topics related to human rights rightfully take a prominent place in the OSCE agenda, the participating States have hardly displayed the political will to look into the problems of millions of refugees in the OSCE region. Some parts of the OSCE region account for a greater part of the organization's attention and resources, while the others are not yet at the forefront of the OSCE agenda. Unless OSCE becomes of relevance to all of its participating States, the organization will gradually lose political support of its members.

There is no doubt that terrorism is one of the main threats to international and regional peace and security. It represents a grave challenge to the most fundamental human rights, endangering human lives and infringing upon human dignity. Terrorist acts have a direct negative impact on the stability and sustainable development of States and regions.

The tragic events of 11 September 2001 have once again clearly highlighted the urgent need to unite the efforts of the international community in combating

terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. No double standards should be tolerated in addressing the various dimensions of this challenge.

In pursuing a goal of eradication of terrorism, one has to address its root causes, and to define its links with organized crime and its sources of financing. The factors causing terrorism and lawlessness, such as aggressive nationalism, violent extremism and armed separatism, should be dealt with by the international community in an effective and consistent manner. Serious attention needs to be paid to a complexity of risks and threats emanating from the territories controlled by separatists and turned into zones of all kinds of criminal activity, including arms smuggling, trafficking of drugs, trafficking in human beings and money-laundering.

The ongoing armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan threatens the security not only of my country but of the entire region and of Europe as a whole. There is no room for half-measures and a wait-and-see policy. The deteriorating situation urges principled approaches and calls for immediate action by the international community, including the Security Council. The early settlement of the conflict must finally become the major priority for OSCE, and we expect a contribution to be made in this regard by the incoming Netherlands Chairmanship.

Although since 1992 the Minsk process has not yielded tangible results, Azerbaijan still remains committed to the peaceful settlement of the conflict on the basis of the commonly recognized norms and principles of international law, the relevant Security Council resolutions and the appropriate OSCE documents and decisions.

However, Armenia should have no illusions — Azerbaijan will restore its territorial integrity by all means provided for by the United Nations Charter and international law.

With regard to the statement of the Armenian Minister on 6 December 2002, I would like to make the following observations.

Armenian rhetoric on "peace, cooperation and hand of friendship extended to Azerbaijan" is a cynical attempt to distract attention of the OSCE participating States from the decade-long aggression against my country and violated rights of Azerbaijani refugees. Having seized the Azerbaijani territories by military force, having ethnically cleansed one million Azerbaijanis from Armenia, the Nagorno-Karabakh region and seven Azerbaijani districts around it, having pillaged and burned down hundreds of Azerbaijani towns and villages, having destroyed thousands of Azerbaijani historical and cultural objects and monuments in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia is now resorting to propagandistic tricks in trying to consolidate the results of aggression. Under these circumstances the legitimate right of Azerbaijan under international law to defend itself against aggression is presented by Armenia as "war-mongering".

I would like to mention that Azerbaijan has always been supportive of the concept of regional cooperation at both the multilateral and bilateral levels. My country is a co-founder and active member of such regionally focused initiatives as the Transport Corridor Europe Caucasia Asia (TRACECA) programme, the GUUAM group, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Council, the Economic Cooperation Organization and others. We develop fruitful and mutually beneficial multifaceted cooperation with our immediate neighbours — Georgia, the Islamic

Republic of Iran, the Russian Federation and Turkey — building upon principles of good neighbourliness and mutual respect.

As regards our cooperation with Armenia, given the de facto state of war and continued occupation of the Azerbaijani territories, only the settlement of the conflict will pave the way to restoration of our cooperation with Armenia. Interruption of all our economic ties with Armenia is a natural consequence of aggressive policy, pursued against my country. We have to face the realities: trenches separating Armenian and Azerbaijani soldiers are located deep inside the territory of *my* country, and not Armenia, and they could hardly provide a good incentive for any bilateral endeavours. This has been the case in all other conflict zones so far and we have no reason to believe that the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan might represent any exception in this regard.

In respect to continuous efforts by Armenia to distort the very notion of the principle of self-determination, let me refer the Armenian Minister to the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. The principle of self-determination in international law is applied along with principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of state borders, and is exercised in a peaceful manner. Demands for "independence" in the situation of military occupation by Armenia of the Azerbaijani territories has nothing in common with the principle of self-determination.

As to the Minister's numerous references to the so-called "people of Nagorno-Karabakh" I do not intend to enter into a discussion of whether the notion of "people" can be applied to an Armenian minority living in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. Allow me just to recall that the population of the Nagorno-Karabakh region consists of two communities — Azerbaijanis and Armenians. While historically Nagorno-Karabakh has been part of Azerbaijan, including also in the Soviet period, it has never been for a single day a part of Armenia.

The forceful expulsion of all Azerbaijanis from their homes in the Nagorno-Karabakh region has not changed the status of the region under international law as an inseparable part of Azerbaijan, or elevated the status of the Armenian community.

Regarding the ridiculous attempts of Armenia to portray itself as a "defender" of the Minsk group, it is worth mentioning that Armenia has repeatedly blocked the Minsk group's proposals. The Armenian Minister who participated in the OSCE Summit meeting held in Lisbon in 1996 might wish to recall that it was his country that rejected the proposals of the Minsk group supported by the heads of State and Government of all OSCE participating States.

Armenia has long been waging a covert war against the norms and principles of international law. Utter rejection by that country of any reference to principles of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders in any OSCE document was raised yesterday to a qualitatively new level — the outright call to change international boarders. Defiance of the fundamental principles off the Helsinki Final Act must be finally challenged.